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At the root of recurring bank crises are deeply-implanted incentives for
banks and their executives to take systemically excessive risk. Since the 2008-
2009 financial crisis, regulators have sought to strengthen the financial system
by requiring more capital (which can absorb losses from risk-taking) and less
risk-taking, principally via command-and-control rules. Yet bankers' baseline
incentives for system-degrading risk-taking remain intact.
A key but underappreciated reason for banks' recurring excessive risk-
taking is the structure of corporate taxation. Current tax rules penalize equity
and boost debt, thereby undermining the capital adequacy efforts that have been
central to the post-crisis reform agenda. This tax-based distortion incentivizes
financial firms to undermine regulators' capital adequacy rules, either
transactionally or by lobbying for their repeal. The resulting debt-heavy
structure not only renders banks fragile but also pushes them toward further
excessively risky strategies.
This result is not inevitable. By repurposing tax tools used elsewhere, we
show how the safety-undermining impact of the corporate tax can be reversed
without affecting the overall level of tax revenue that the government raises from
the financial sector. Several means to the desired end are possible, with the best
trade-off between administrability and effectiveness being to lift the tax penalty
on banks to the extent that they add to their loss-absorbing, safety-enhancing
equity buffer above the regulatory minimum. This solution would minimize the
tax impact. Revenue loss would be small and could be offset by modest tax
changes targeted at the riskiest forms of financial sector debt. Existing studies
indicate that the magnitude of the resulting safety benefit should rival the size of
the benefitfrom all the post-crisis capital regulation to date. Thus the main thesis
we bring forward is not a small or technical claim.
Standard bank regulatory style is command-and-control, and while much
can be and has been accomplished with the standard style, it has its limits. In
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today's political environment, current safety rules' continuance may not be
viable, as a repeal of recent regulatory advances, rather than refinement, has
become a serious possibility. Yet rolling back the post-crisis regulatory advances
without addressing the underlying risk-taking incentives would be unwise. While
our policy preference would be to supplement and not replace traditional and
recent regulation with the tax reform, any major rollback makes reducing the
risk-taking tax distortion more urgent than ever.
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Introduction
Well-capitalized financial firms with considerable safe equity and a
traditional banking business model generally handled the 2008 financial crisis
well,' while weakly-capitalized banks and banks that took on excessively risky
activities failed or tottered.2 Lehman Brothers and Bear Steams-two of the
iconic failures-had less than four percent of their value in equity, allowing
relatively small losses to cripple those firms.3 Banks that were unable to
smoothly absorb losses stemming from turmoil in the American housing market
1. See, e.g., Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe:
Why Did Some Banks Perform Better?, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2012); Ash Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica
Detragiache & Ouarda Merrouche, Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 45 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 1147 (2013).
2. By banks, we refer not only to commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions,
but also to investment banks and broker-dealers, like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
3. Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, The Sub-prime Crisis: Causal
Distortions and Regulatory Reform, in RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL
TURMOIL OF 2007 AND 2008 (2008).
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failed, struggled, or were bailed out by the government and, as a consequence,
cut back their lending.4 Lending declined throughout the financial system,
slowing economic growth, first in the United States and then around the world,
with the world's lost economic output exceeding ten trillion dollars.
Regulators and analysts concluded that better-capitalized financial
institutions with fewer risky activities could have better performed their essential
economic functions during the crisis. Accordingly, a major regulatory initiative
has been to raise capital levels at the world's major financial institutions and to
limit their riskiest activities.6
The strategy fully satisfies few: pro-regulation critics see the mandated
increases in capital and new restrictions in activities as insufficient, too readily
reversible, and prone to end-runs by the regulated. Market measures of bank
risk do not show much of a decrease from pre-crisis levels,8 and several primary
regulators are skeptical that the regulatory reaction arrests the chance of another
financial crisis. 9 New systemic risks will eventually emerge and, when the
system is off its high-alert of the first post-crisis few years, authorities are less
likely to react quickly and perspicaciously.
More could be done, but more command-and-control regulation will have
diminishing safety returns and is becoming increasingly privately costly for
banks. Banks are already readying to seek to roll back mandated post-crisis
increases in bank equity-increases that important outside analysts see as
insufficient to stabilize the financial system in a future crisis:
4. Jonathan Bridges et al., The Impact of Capital Requirements on Bank Lending (Bank
of Eng. Working Paper No. 486, 2014), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents
/workingpapers/2014/wp486.pdf[http://perma.cc/9EBH-8E7P].
5. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM: FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK
ACT (2013).
6. On capital adequacy, see, for example, Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve
Sys., Speech at the Banque de France Conference: Capital Regulation Across Financial Intermediaries
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20150928a.htm
[http://perma.cc/2HWW-VSYC] ("Strengthening the ... capital held by banks has been a central element
of post-financial crisis regulatory reform."). On activity restrictions, see, for example, Charles K.
Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 39 (2011).
7. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Policy Makers Skeptical on Preventing Financial Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/economy/policy-makers-
skeptical-on-preventing-financial-crisis.html [http://perma.cc/LL2U-679G] (reporting the Federal
Reserve conference's prevailing wisdom that a crisis like that of 2008 can readily recur); Dan Wilchins
& Jonathan Stempel, Citigroup Gets Massive Government Bailout, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2008, 7:05
PM), http: //www.reuters.com/article/us-citigroup-idUSTRE4AJ45G2008 1125 [http://perma.cc
/2RW6-NHXY].
8. See Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, Understanding Bank Risk Through
Market Measures, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2016, at 57, 57 (noting that market data
points to banks not being safer, despite post-crisis regulation).
9. Binyamin Appelbaum, Federal Reserve Executive Says Banks Are Still Too Big To
Fail', N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/business/dealbook/federal-
reserves-kashkari-says-banks-still-too-big-to-fail.html [http://perma.cc/LE5Z-98RR]; Andrew Haldane,
Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng. & Vasileios Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at the
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"Left to our own devices," said Lloyd Blankfein, boss of Goldman Sachs, in
February [2017], "we wouldn't hold as much capital as we are holding." He is not
alone. "It is clear that the banks have too much capital," wrote Jamie Dimon of
JPMorgan Chase, America's biggest bank by assets, in a letter to shareholders [in
April 2017].10
And new public policymakers seem ready to accommodate the banks, by
scaling back some or much of the post-crisis safety regulation."
This reaction is part of a general pattern: banks and other financial firms
resist regulation that reduces their profitability, lobby against it, and innovate to
work around it. This regulatory avoidance then requires new regulation to
maintain safety. The regulatory and counter efforts create complexity and absorb
economic resources, top management attention, and the energy of the nation's
top regulators, with each side's efforts often neutralizing the other'S. 2 Banks can
create too much private value for themselves by avoiding regulatory impact
compared to what they can earn by improving financial channels for lenders and
borrowers.
An additional strategy is available. Instead of further micromanaging banks
with increasingly complex but less effective rules, regulators can reduce risk by
directly acting on financial firms' incentives. Core to the real incentives for any
American business is the corporate tax. But current tax rules work against
financial stability by penalizing equity and favoring debt. This tax-based
distortion then incentivizes financial institutions to undermine capital adequacy
rules, either transactionally or by lobbying for repeal and withdrawal of the
regulation.
The pro-debt bias arises because the cost of debt is deductible from the
corporate tax bill, while the cost of equity is not.1 3 Firms consequently can reduce
their tax-adjusted average cost of finance by using more debt and less equity than
they otherwise would. While this tax effect is well known and affects all firms,
it is particularly pernicious for banks as their principal "raw material" is not steel
10. American Banks Think They Are Over-Regulated, ECONOMIST (May 4, 2017)
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21721504-time-loosen-reins-say-americas-banks-not-
so-fast-say-regulators-american-banks [http://perma.cc/F4SX-4PH5] (emphasis added).
11. See John Heltman, Big Banks Plead for Capital Relief D.C. Is Listening, AM.
BANKER (July 11, 2017, 1:06 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/big-banks-plead-for-capital-
relief-dc-is-listening [http://perma.cc/K6KL-SHDT].
12. See, e.g., Rym Ayadi et al., Does Basel Compliance Matterfor Bank Performance?
3 n.5 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 15/100, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2613299
[http://perma.cc/3VY8-RAWG] ("By the end of 2014, Citigroup had nearly 30,000 employees working
on regulatory and compliance issues (an increase of 33 percent since 2011)."). Complexity undermines
regulatory effectiveness. See Haldane & Madouros, supra note 9, at 1-3.
13. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost
of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963); see also Ending the Debt Addiction: A Senseless
Subsidy, ECONOMIST (May 16, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21651220-most-
western-economies-sweeten-cost-borrowing-bad-idea-senseless-subsidy [http://perma.cc/L7MA-
KXN3]; Mark J. Roe & Michael Troege, How To Use a Bank Tax to Make the Financial System Safer,
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ft.com/content/468a9fe2-b2ce-11e3-8038-00144feabdcO
[http://perma.cc/387W-RPT5].
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or electricity, but funding. Increasing equity adversely affects banks' funding
costs because equity is taxed unfavorably. For banks, even a small tax increase
in their funding costs-a fraction of a percent-can alter their behavior in large
ways, because the change affects banks' ability to compete with more highly
leveraged banks and with the newer non-taxed financial intermediaries that are
proliferating in the so-called shadow banking sector.14
Tax-induced excessive leverage in financial firms is also more
economically damaging than excessive leverage in industrial firms. Failure is
costly for any firm, its employees, its executives, and its financiers, but a big
bank's failure, unlike that of a major industrial firm, can spill over to severely
damage other firms and the overall economy.
The tax bias toward debt has not attracted the attention it deserves perhaps
because of how the financial crisis of 2008-2009 played out.' 5 No immediate
pre-crisis change in corporate taxation weakened the financial system.16
Policymakers and academic analysts accordingly focused on the proximate
causes-a housing bubble and weakly-capitalized financial institutions. But the
preexisting levels of debt were too high largely because of the tax-based debt
bias. To analogize: if one observes a fall off a cliff after an unexpected gust of
wind, one might only blame the weather and the wind; here we blame the
decision to walk near the cliff's edge.
In the spirit of seeking the doable, we show how an incremental, targeted
tax reform that ends the tax penalty for the equity of banks and other financial
firms can achieve much of the safety-inducing goals of more comprehensive tax
14. See Jeremy C. Stein, Comment, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spr.
2010, at 50, 52; Claire Celerier, Thomas K. Kick & Steven Ongena, Changes in the Cost ofBank Equity
and the Supply ofBank Credit (Working Paper, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=2829326 [http://perma.cc/7XW7-T3KE] (demonstrating that changes in the tax cost of equity in Italy
and Belgium strongly affect banks' competitiveness). An example: banks borrow from savers and then
lend to those needing cash. Those needing cash can today issue securities that are packaged in the shadow-
banking sector and sold directly to savers. These shadow banks can often pass through their income and
are taxed more favorably than traditional banks, which are subject to the standard tax on corporate income.
See George Pennacchi, Banks, Taxes and Nonbank Competition, 52 J. FIN. SERV. RES. (forthcoming
2017).
15. See Fiscal Affairs Dep't, Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in
Tax Policy, IMF (June 12, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8W5P-X99M]. The IMF later abandoned their corporate tax analysis for minor bank
levies and a financial transactions tax on trading turnover instead. A Fair and Substantial Contribution by
the Financial Sector, Final Report for the G-20, IMF (June 2010), http://www.imf.org/external
/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VSA-C4YT]. Policymakers worldwide prefer a bank levy or
a financial transactions tax and not overhauling the corporate tax and the interest deduction. For strong
academic analysis of the corporate tax and banking, see Hilary J. Allen, Let's Talk About Tax: Fixing
Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821 (2013); Ruud A. de Mooij,
Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions, 33 FISCAL STUD. 489 (2012); cf
Mark J. Roe, Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-To-Fail Finance, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1419, 1452-53 (2014); Mark J. Roe & Michael Troege, How to Use a Bank To Make the Financial System
Safer, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ft.com/content/468a9fe2-b2ce-11e3-8038-00144feabdcO
[http://perma.cc/387W-RPT5].
16. See Douglas A. Schackelford, Daniel N. Shaviro & Joel Slemrod, Taxation and the
Financial Sector, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 781, 783-84 (2010).
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reform. This can be achieved without raising or lowering the overall tax load for
banks. The least intrusive way to do so is to reduce the added taxation on equity
for banks that increase their equity above their regulatory minima, while
maintaining the unfavorable taxation of the regulatory equity that banks must
have in any case. If, after the expected capital adjustments, banks would still be
paying less tax than under the status quo, then an offsetting reduction to the tax
benefit of the financial system's riskiest debt can be levied.
Our plan will encourage banks to have equity that noticeably exceeds
today's regulatory minima. This extra equity is particularly useful in a financial
crisis, when banks must maintain regulatory capital at the minimum level
required. During the last crisis, banks desperately avoided violating capital rules
by cutting back lending and shrinking their loan assets to fit their diminished
equity. This led to a credit crunch that hurt the real economy.' 7 Hence, while
higher equity, whether required or incentivized, reduces the chance of bank
failure, higher required equity does not do as much for the economy during a
crisis as higher non-required equity. With higher required equity, banks are more
likely to find themselves too close to the regulatory line and, hence, cut their
lending in a crisis, to shrink their assets to fit their shrunken equity. A
systemically better-capitalized banking system, with equity levels well above the
regulatory minimum, would then have been, and would be at this writing, less
susceptible to economy-wide degrading systemic risk events.
Overall, more strongly capitalized banks, with more safe equity, should
better absorb systemic upheavals, fail less often and less severely, transmit less
risk and loss into the financial system, and less sharply cut back lending in a
crisis.
Moreover, international experience with tax structures similar to those we
analyze clearly shows that financial firms subject to directionally correct tax
incentives will voluntarily lower debt and increase equity, promoting rather than
resisting capital strengthening. The magnitude of this increase from a properly-
designed reform should rival the size of all the post-crisis mandates to increase
capital. Thus this is not a small, technical claim we bring forward, but a major
one. Given that the current policy environment has seen influential calls for a
major regulatory rollback,1 our tax-incentivized proposal takes on more
urgency.
17. Viral Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Introduction, in RESTORING FINANCIAL
STABILITY: How TOREPAIRAFAILED SYSTEM 11-12 (Viral Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009).
18. Michael C. Bender & Damian Paletta, Donald Trump Plans To Undo Dodd-Frank
Law, Fiduciary Rule, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2017, 7:44 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-moves-
to-undo-dodd-frank-law-1486101602 [http://perma.cc/35GD-KPDL]; Ryan Rainey, Hensarling: Dodd-
Frank Repeal Coming Under Trump, MORNING CONSULT (Nov. 10, 2016),
http://www.morningconsult.com/2016/11/10/hensarling-dodd-frank-repeal-coming-trump
[http://perma.cc/XU77-3DKD] (reporting that Jeb Hensarling, chair of the House Financial Services
Committee, urges and expects Dodd-Frank repeal); Glenn Thrush, Trump Vows to Dismantle Dodd-Frank
Disaster,' N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-dodd-
frank-regulations.html [http://perma.cc/GHH4-UWAC].
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A roadmap for this Article: in Part I, we review the major post-crisis
regulatory efforts to improve financial safety, demonstrate why critics conclude
they are incomplete, and observe that well-placed actors now seek to reverse
them.
In Part II, we show the pro-debt bias of taxation and how treating debt and
equity symmetrically eliminates it. We then examine how the taxation of bank
debt and equity can be equalized, progressing through several reforms, starting
with the most comprehensive and then narrowing scope until we reach in Part III
our preferred, targeted, new, and quite likely efficacious restructuring of
financial taxation. We would allow financial firms to deduct an imputed cost of
their equity on the portion of their equity that exceeds what regulators require.
This effort is operationally viable and politically possible, could be made tax-
revenue neutral, and, despite being modest in its incremental scope, would
greatly benefit financial safety. It would make difficult-to-implement safety
regulations more viable and some of them unnecessary.
In Part IV, we compare how the tax imbalance distorts corporate
governance in industrial corporations with how it distorts corporate governance
in banks, to show that the most prominent fixes for industrial firms will degrade
financial safety if applied to banks. For large industrial firms, the tax-induced
preference for leverage mitigates managerial debilities. But for already highly
levered financial firms, further increasing their leverage lacks meaningful
corporate governance benefits and is costly in governance terms because it
encourages banks' executives and boards to take on more risk, which is just what
regulators want the banks to avoid. The most commonly proposed debt-equity
fix for industrial firms is a dividend deduction. For banks, this would incentivize
very large payouts of cash, which would further destabilize them when the policy
goal is the opposite: to induce the banks to retain more cash.
In Part V, we examine the empirical evidence, which points to the tax fix
as likely to rival the strength of all post-crisis capital regulation. Banks in nations
that accord debt a lower tax advantage than other nations have less debt and more
equity; banks react to increases or decreases in debt's tax advantage by
decreasing or increasing their equity levels accordingly.
In Part VI, we examine basic objections to the proposal, such as the
potential for gaming the system to private advantage. While these cannot be
dismissed out of hand, most gaming of the proposal will improve financial
safety. And the current tax imbalance encourages safety-diminishing gaming,
which our proposal would reverse or decrease.
In Part VII, we evaluate the relevant banking tax proposals in policy circles,
both international and domestic, and in Congress. Some are better than others,
but all fall short of what can and should be done. Most would be inefficacious.
Some would be systemically dangerous. We also evaluate the end-of-2017 tax
reform, which, by lowering the corporate tax rate that banks pay, will affect
188
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banks' capitalization incentives for the better. We briefly describe why it falls
short of making banks as safe as plausible, and offer predictions.
Overall, we make three primary points for improving financial safety-
none of which we believe has been made before-by intersecting legal literatures
on financial regulation, corporate taxation, and corporate governance: (1) that
the tax benefit can be achieved by focusing on equity levels above the regulatory-
required amounts, making the concomitant revenue-neutral tax adjustments
practicable; (2) that the currently-favored overall equity-debt tax reforms, which
differ from ours, would work for industrial firms, but cause havoc with banking
safety and, hence, need to be rejected for banks; and (3) that extrapolating from
the extant empirical literature, the impact of our revenue-neutral tax proposal
would be about that of all post-2009 crisis capital regulation, making the
potential impact on financial stability here not at all small.
I. Regulation Thus Far and Why It Must Be Incomplete
Regulators intensely sought to strengthen the financial system after the
2008-2009 financial crisis, primarily by using command-and-control regulation.
In this Part, we summarize that effort and its limits.
A. Strengthening Command-and-Control Rules
1. Traditional Command-and-Control
Traditional bank regulation requires capital adequacy, aiming to make
banks able to withstand losses, and restricts their riskiest activities, aiming to
make large losses less likely. After the crisis, regulators used both tools to
strengthen the financial system.
But increasing bank equity enough to be able to absorb losses of the size
suffered during the financial crisis has proven difficult.1 9 The best evidence
indicates that capital levels are still not high enough.20 The Financial Stability
Board, a major post-crisis international regulatory consortium, estimates that a
19. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms-Basel III, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS (2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf [http://perma.cc/7KKU-
XXK8] [hereinafter Basel lll]; see also HAL S. SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS 169-82 (2016). The most prominent academic critical evaluation
of the international capital requirements as still being far too low is ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG,
THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 179-91
(2013).
20. "Merrill Lynch ... lost 19% [of its value]. It would have needed a core-capital ratio
of 23% to avoid falling through the 4% floor. . . ." Reforming Banking: Base Camp Basel, Regulators
Are Trying To Make Banks Better Equipped Against Catastrophe, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/15328883 [http://perma.cc/MEU8-WYNH]. An IMF study points to
fifteen percent to seventeen percent equity as the level of risk-weighted capital needed to withstand most
financial crises, such as the one we had. See Jihad Dagher et al., Benefits and Costs ofBank Capital 19
(IMF Staff Discussion Note, Mar. 2016), http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-
Notes/Issues/2016/12/31/Benefits-and-Costs-of-Bank-Capital-43710 [http://perma.cc/EE3P-LV23].
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seven percent equity requirement, roughly the current rule, would have stabilized
no more than one-quarter of the largest banks.2 1 Alan Greenspan, the former
Federal Reserve chair, argued for equity levels of up to twenty-to-thirty
percent.22
2. New Command-and-Control Strategies
Because banks resist both sharply higher equity levels and limits on their
activities, regulators seek different tools to stabilize banks. They have mandated
not only increases of banks' going concern loss absorption capacity via increases
in capital, but also shock absorbers for bank failure via debt that can rapidly be
turned into equity, which takes up a bank's business loss before the bank's basic
business is deeply damaged23 and still has all of debt's tax advantages in normal
times. In a sense, this is a command-and-control capital requirement, with the
extra capital mandated in the form of tax-deductible debt when the bank is stable
and solvent. Our proposal is in the spirit of these existing concepts-to remove
the tax consideration from banks' calculus on whether to add more capital that
can absorb loss in a crisis-but to do so more effectively.
An added strategy to stabilize banks has been to lift their liquidity, by
24
requiring banks to own assets that can readily be sold for cash quickly. Whether
these liquidity rules are improving the long-term stability of the financial system
and whether they stabilized highly indebted banks enough is questionable, as the
25
recent European bank failures have demonstrated.
B. Limits to Command-and-Control Bank Regulation and the Limits of the
Regulator
While these overall efforts have made the system safer to an uncertain
degree, they are reaching their limits and may be affecting bank efficiency.
21. Historical Losses and Recapitalisation Needs Findings Report, FIN. STABILITY BD.
23 tbl.A2 (2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Historical-Losses-and-Recapitalisation-Needs-
findings-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/62CD-2YTN].
22. See Alan Greenspan, More Capital Is a Less Painful Way To Fix the Banks, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.ft.com/content/4d55622a-44c8-11e5-af2f-4d6eOe5eda22
[http://perma.cc/BL2P-FHNR].
23. See Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding
Company Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,266
(Jan. 24, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, 252).
24. See Basel III, supra note 19.
25. See Rachel Sanderson, Italian Finance Minister Reassures over Liquidity of
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1. Limits to Regulatory Perspicacity
Command-and-control regulation puts much of the economic onus for error
on the regulators, but government officials lack enough contextual knowledge
for understanding which regulatory commands are efficacious and which are
onerous. They must predict how inherently uncertain future economic conditions
will affect banks. They may mistakenly ban a profitable activity that poses
* 26
minimal risks. Conversely, they may misunderstand how, say, credit
derivatives can put a financial firm at risk of failing.27 Such misjudgments are
neither isolated nor unlikely to recur. They are common, contributed to the 2008-
2009 financial crisis,28 and are embedded in the regulators' limited knowledge
base. Financial regulation must be incomplete, over-shooting and under-shooting
the mark in promoting safety.
This is an instance of the generalized limits of centralized information and
the value of decentralized decisionmaking, a view Friedrich Hayek famously
promoted.29 Regulators have limited information and that which they have is
often distorted, because it is mismeasured and because the regulated players are
often its source. Banks find transactional channels that the rules do not penalize
but accomplish the same end; the banks have little reason to inform regulators
that the channels are close to the regulated channel but unregulated.3 0
But an improved incentive-based structure using tax rules can harness
information closer to the market than command-and-control regulation. When
the bank is thinly capitalized, its incentives are to take risk and, hence, the
regulators' rules reduce the banks' range of permitted risk-taking. But the
regulators are far from the scene and not as well informed as the bankers
themselves, so the regulators will over-regulate and under-regulate particular
risky activities. But if the bank raises its own equity level voluntarily because
negative tax incentives are removed, its biases toward risk-taking diminish, and
because it is better informed than the regulators, its actions will more accurately
reduce the costliest risk-taking. While the result may be insufficient, the
incentives of the better informed players will improve. Although this information
concept is not alien to tax theory,3 ' it surprisingly is not part of the analytics of
bank safety regulation.
26. Cf Sarin & Summers, supra note 8, at 59, 89, 95-102 (observing that safety-seeking
regulation is eroding big banks' franchise value).
27. See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World ofRisky Debt, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1151, 1182-98 (2010).
28. See Viral V. Acharya, Philipp Schnabl & Gustavo Suarez, Securitization Without
Risk Transfer, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 515, 515 (2013).
29. See, e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, 4 AM. ECON. REV.
519 (1945). Decentralized decisionmaking in banks with a thin equity layer has better-informed actors
deciding but lacking good incentives for systemic safety. The proposals here aim to better align incentives.
30. Donald J. Smith, Hidden Debt: From Enron's Commodity Prepays to Lehman's
Repo 105s, 67 FIN. ANAL. J. 15 (2011).
31. Cf Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to
Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4, 7 (2002).
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2. Limits of the New Resolution System
Major efforts now seek to resolve failed banks well, by rapidly putting the
losses on long-term debt. But these mechanisms have proven unwieldy, are yet
to be tested, and may not work as planned in a crisis.32 Stalling litigation is
plausible, incomplete regulatory authority is likely,33 and, given the global nature
of the largest financial institutions and markets, may be unworkable because
international regulatory coordination is still too low. 34 Regulators, fearful of
failure, may refuse to test the new resolution structures,35 waiting until it is too
late when they again feel compelled to bail out the banks.
One can only learn for sure whether the planning process works by seeing
36how it performs in a crisis, with little possibility of a mid-course correction.
European regulators started down this path earlier than their American
counterparts and have not succeeded: in the first half of 2017, multiple European
banks with the purportedly easy-to-restructure debt in place failed, but instead of
being privately restructured, several failed institutions were bailed out.37
32. See Mark J. Roe, Why Regulators Are Needed To Handle Failed Banks, N.Y. TIMES
(June 6, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/business/dealbook/why-regulators-are-needed-to-
handle-failed-banks.html [http://perma.cc/4X72-5RM5]; see also Howell E. Jackson & Stephanie
Massman, The Resolution ofDistressed Financial Conglomerates, 3 RSF J. SOC. SCIEN. 48 (2017); Paul
H. Kupiec, Is Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority Necessary To Fix Too-Big-To-Fail? (AEI
Working Paper No. 2015-09, 2015), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Kupiec-Oct-22-
working-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/6R83-DDL5].
33. Cf State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(challenging regulators' authority under the Dodd-Frank resolution regime, with appellate court deferring
decision as not ripe until an emergency contemplated by the statute arose); Note, D.C. Circuit Limits
Prospects for Challenging Dodd-Frank's Orderly Liquidation Authority, 129 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2016).
34. Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins, 1 J.
FIN. REG. 3 (2015); Federico Lupo-Pasini & Ross P. Buckley, International Coordination in Cross-
Border Bank Bail-ins: Problems and Prospects, 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 203, 203 (2015) ("[B]ail-in
suffers from complex coordination problems.").
35. John Gallemore, Does Bank Opacity Enable Regulatory Forbearance? (2013)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University ofNorth Carolina) (on file with author).
36. See Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point
of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (Dec. 18, 2013); see also John F. Bovenzi, Randall D. Guynn &
Thomas H. Jackson, Too Big To Fail: The Path to a Solution, BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR. (May 2013),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/TooBigToFail.pdf [http://perma.cc
/H9X7-5D25] (discussing a bankruptcy channel for financial resolution); Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon
& Mark J. Roe to Senator Michael Crapo et al., Financial Scholars Oppose Eliminating 'Orderly
Liquidation Authority' as Crisis-Avoidance Restructuring Backstop, May 23, 2017,
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2979546 [http://perma.cc/NGL2-CJT7].
37. Neel Kashkari, New Bailouts Prove 'Too Big To Fail' Is Alive and Well, WALL ST.
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3. Limits Due to Distorted Incentives from Taxes and the Too-Big-To-
Fail Boost for Debt
Distorted incentives deepen these problems. There is a double regulatory
subsidy to bank debt (over bank equity): the first comes from the implicit too-
big-to-fail guarantee on big banks' borrowings, a subsidy that waxes and wanes,
depending on the strength of the economy and the anticipation of regulatory help
for bank debt. This subsidy pushes banks to use more debt than equity, because
creditors understand that in a crisis they will (usually) be paid at government
expense, whereas shareholders' losses will (usually) be absorbed by the
shareholders themselves. The second regulatory subsidy is the pervasive tax
advantage of debt, due (in simplistic terms) to the deductibility of interest on
debt and the nondeductibility of dividends on equity.
To illustrate verbally: Posit that banking regulators require banks to double
their level of equity. If a bank's size stays the same, the bank would reduce its
own borrowing concomitantly. But that bank borrowing would have been tax
beneficial, with the interest paid deductible from the tax bill, while returns to the
new equity will not be. The bank's tax bill would rise, making the new equity
expensive. The Appendix shows how increased equity for Goldman Sachs along
the lines and magnitude of respected safety proposals could devastate the bank's
after-tax profits.
Given this double subsidy for debt, it is not surprising that banks see equity
as costlier than debt.38 Increased equity should reduce the too-big-to-fail subsidy,
by making banks less likely to fail. Moreover, the tax disparity itself can be
ended-or even reversed to counterbalance any remaining too-big-to-fail
subsidy. In this paper, we shall show how.
II. Taxing Banks Properly to Make Them Safer
In this Part, we show the basic tax bias toward debt embedded in today's
tax code and then outline a simple, revenue-neutral way to reverse the bias. We
consider mechanisms to right the balance: first, an economy-wide, but thus far
unattainable, rebalancing of the taxation of all debt and equity. Next, and second,
we consider a bank-specific end to the tax deductibility of bank-paid interest. It
is the simplest fix conceptually and the most disruptive to implement. We then
in the next Part develop our proposal: a targeted allowance for bank equity.
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38. Bankers say more equity will raise banks' cost of funding, induce them to raise their
lending rates, and then reduce overall economic growth. See The Cumulative Impact on the Global
Economy of Changes in the Financial Regulatory Framework, INT'L INST. FIN. 12 tbl.I.2. (Sept. 2011),
http://www.iif.com/file/7080/ [http://perma.cc/E6PV-7BJX].
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A. The Basic Pro-Debt Bias Stated
The basic tax bias toward debt arises from the American corporation now
paying a thirty-five percent tax on its net profits. (This rate is scheduled to go to
twenty-one percent, diminishing the effect, but maintaining the bulk of it.) Both
banks and nonbanks alike pay this tax. The corporation deducts its interest
expense on debt from its gross profits, but cannot deduct its costs for common
equity, such as the dividends and capital gains that stockholders expect. 39
Consider two operationally identical trillion-dollar firms, with one raising
its funding only via equity, while the other raises its funding via significant
borrowing. Both earn five percent, or $50 billion, from operations. At a thirty-
five percent tax rate, the unlevered, all-equity firm pays thirty-five percent of
$50 billion in taxes and has a $32.5 billion return to its owners. The first column
of figures illustrates:
Table 1: Corporate Tax Impact in an All-Equity vs. a Highly-Leveraged Firm
All-equity firm Highly-leveraged firm
Earnings from operations: $50 billion $50 billion
Deductible interest: 0 (40 billion)
Income before corp. taxes: 50 billion 10 billion
Corporate income tax: (17.5 billion) (3.5 billion)
Income to shareholders: 32.5 billion 6.5 billion
Income to creditors: 0 40 billion
Total investor income: S32.5 billion S46.5 billion
The second firm borrows heavily to fund itself and pays $40 billion in
interest, the deductibility of which lowers its tax bill. By paying taxes on the net
income of $10 billion at a thirty-five percent tax rate, it returns $46.5 billion to
its investors ($40 billion to its creditors and $6.5 billion to its stockholders, from
$10 billion in pre-tax income, minus $3.5 billion in corporate income tax),
yielding $14 billion more to its investors. Hence, unless this rather large
difference of $14 billion is fully offset by the increased risk of failure, financial
stress, or operational degradation, the total value to investors of the second,
indebted firm will be much higher than that of the first firm. The second column
of figures shows the higher after-tax returns to investors in the highly-leveraged
firm.
39. Sven Langedijk, Gaetan Nicodeme, Andrea Pagano & Alessandro Rossi, Debt Bias
in Corporate Taxation and the Costs of Banking Crises in the EU (Eur. Comm'n Taxation Papers,
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To emphasize this result (which is standard in financial analysis): the total
value that these firms create for private investors comes from the sum of all
monies returned to investors. The all-equity operation returns $14 billion less to
its investors than does the leveraged firm. Ordinarily the leveraged firm would
be worth much more to its total investor pool than the all-equity firm, solely due
to the tax deductibility of interest paid.
One might mistakenly think that the investors in the leveraged firm have
suffered compared to the investors in the all-equity firm. Stockholders of the
highly-leveraged firm get $6.5 billion after taxes while the all-equity
stockholders get $32.5 billion. But such a view is wrong because the leveraged
firm needs, and would get, less investment from stockholders. The key feature is
which firm can return more dollars to the totality of its investors. Clearly, it's the
leveraged firm.
Tax aficionados know that this is not the whole story. While equity is
costlier to the firm's tax bill, individuals are taxed more favorably on equity than
on debt, via low tax rates on dividends and capital gains taxes. This tax advantage
of equity for investors partially offsets its tax disadvantage at the firm level.40
Balancing out these pluses and minuses yields a mixed analytic, but the
consensus is that when all factors are added up, the tax system is biased toward
debt.4 '
A firm will generally choose its debt level by trading off the positive and
negative effects of leverage. If the tax savings from debt were not in the mix of
trade-offs, then the chance of failure would weigh more strongly in the bank's
mix of pluses and minuses. Everything else equal, the current corporate tax
system pushes firms in general, and banks in particular, to take on more debt. If
we fixed this bias, banks would take on less debt, would be more stable, and
would drag the economy down in crisis less often and less severely.
B. Comprehensive Tax Reform or Bank-Specific Tax Reform?
This bias towards debt pervades the corporate economy. Proposals to even
up the taxation of debt and equity throughout the economy have regularly been
made but not enacted.42 Good reasons support a system-wide reform. By
40. The same principle reduces the investor-level tax disadvantage of debt. But while
interest income is generally taxed to investors, debt held by untaxed entities is not. The earnings on debt
instruments owned by tax exempt entities are never taxed, but the interest paid is still deducted from the
issuer's tax bill. The issuer of equity, however, enjoys no tax deduction. "[T]he share of U.S. corporate
stock held in taxable accounts fell more than two-thirds over the past 50 years, from 83.6 percent in 1965
to 24.2 percent in 2015." Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S.
Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 923 (2016).
41. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 441-43 (11th ed. 2014); John R. Graham, How Big Are the Tax Benefits ofDebt?,
55 J. FIN. 1901 (2000).
42. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME (Jan. 1992).
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encouraging nonbank operating firms to raise their outside capital more via debt
than via equity, firms become more susceptible to financial stress and failure.
Hence, even industry-only interest-based tax reform should bolster
financial safety (and not just bolster industrial firm stability), by reducing the
general demand for debt and by making less risky that debt which would
continue to exist.
This point deserves emphasizing. We focus on the tax incentives inside the
financial institution to favor debt over equity. But the debt bias outside in the
real economy raises outside demand for financial institutions to grow, lend, and
finance themselves via debt. This artificially boosted demand for debt induces
an artificially large debt-based financial sector. (The deductibility of interest on
personal debt, such as on household mortgages, has the same systemically
detrimental effect.) Fully fixing the corporate (and household) debt bias would
shrink an unnaturally large financial intermediation sector.43 (And, analogously,
the scheduled reduction in the corporate tax rate to twenty-one percent would
reduce the nonfinancial sector's demand for debt, including bank debt. The
financial sector should shrink somewhat, but to an uncertain degree.)
Moreover, the debt bias arises from the corporate tax. If the corporate tax
were eliminated, the basic bias would disappear; when the corporate tax is
reduced, the bias should be reduced. Proposals to reduce or eliminate the
corporate tax have multiple pluses and minuses. One unstated plus is its positive
impact on bank safety, by reducing industrial sector demand for debt as well as
by reducing financial firms' demand for excessive debt in their capital structure.
While we favor comprehensive reform, we do not pursue our analysis in
that direction. First and foremost, no such full-scale debt-equity reform has yet
proven politically viable.4 4 Second, comprehensive reform implicates issues
beyond financial system safety, such as capital accumulation, industrial
investment, and income distribution. Third, the most-developed tax reform for
industry would devastate the financial industry and degrade systemic safety, as
we analyze in Part IV, meaning that even comprehensive reform must treat
finance and industry differently anyway.
C. Ending the Deductibility ofInterest for Banks
The most direct path to capital structure neutrality is to tax debt the way we
tax equity, that is, to end the deductibility of interest. That would greatly expand
43. Shawn Donnan, Financial Sector in Advanced Economies Is Too Big, Says IMF,
FIN. TIMES (May 12, 2015), http://www.ft.com/content/4b70ee3a-f88c-11e4-8el6-00144feab7de
[http://perma.cc/LXJ5-VLUG].
44. Most comprehensive corporate tax reforms would reduce the corporate incentive to
retain cash, and doing so is not a goal that corporate leaders tend to support. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah
M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995). Below, we indicate the
impact on banks' capital structure and size from the reduction in the corporate tax rate, enacted shortly
before this article went to press. See infra Section VII.B.4.
196
Vol. 35, 2018
Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly
the taxable base for banks. Hence, to avoid a big tax increase, the tax rate for the
pre-interest income base would have to decrease substantially.
We add more structure to the prior financial statements to illustrate.
Consider a trillion-dollar bank with the following capital structure and $50
billion in gross profit before interest:
Table 2: Trillion-dollar Bank's Balance Sheet and Traditional Tax Impact
Traditional bank balance sheet
Loans & investments $1000B 1OOB bonds at 6%
100B short-term debt at 6%
700B deposits at 4%
100B equity
With a traditional corporate tax on profits after deducting interest, this
balance sheet would produce an income statement like that in the right-hand
column of Table 1. This is reproduced below, with more detail, on the left:
Table 3. Trillion-dollar Bank's Income Statements
Traditional bank's income statement, Traditional bank's income statement
traditionally taxed with low corporate tax levied on pre-
interest profit
50B Gross operating profit (income 50B Gross operating profit
from loans & investments) (income from loans &
investments)
(6B) Bond interest (0) 6B Bond interest:
(6B) Short-term interest (0) 6B Short-term interest
(28B) Deposit interest (0) 28B Deposit interest:
lOB Taxable profit 50B Taxable profit
(3.5B Corporate tax (3.B ) Ta\ of 70 on pre-interest
40.5B 1 Afler-t~tx pre-interest
(401B) lInterest paid to creditors,
6.5B Net profit for shareholders, after 6.5B Net profit for stockholders,
interest expenses and taxes after interest expenses and
taxes
This table compares two banks' income statements. The first bank, on the
left, has $40 billion in interest expenses on deposits and debt. It pays tax at a
35% rate on the net profit of $10 billion after deducting interest from its gross
profits. The second pays its tax on pre-interest gross income of $50 million at a
lower 7% rate. The first returns $46.5 billion to its investors, as does the second.
The traditionally-taxed bank on the left pays tax on $10 billion in
profits, from operating income of $50 billion, minus $40 billion in interest
expense. The bank's net profit of $10 billion is taxed at the longstanding thirty-
five percent corporate income tax rate, yielding the tax authorities $3.5 billion.
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Note that in addition to the bank's deposits and short-term borrowings, the bank
borrows $200 billion from capital markets. When it raises capital via debt, it
shields operating income from tax, because the return to that capital is deductible
from its gross income.
The right-hand income statement shows that the Internal Revenue Service
can obtain that same $3.5 billion from this bank by taxing its gross operating
profit of $50 billion, instead of taxing the bank's net profit of $10 billion. To
yield the tax authorities the same $3.5 billion, the tax rate on the gross operating
income of $50 billion would be only 7%.
This reform idea begins with several strengths. It is simple and easy to
understand: the tax impact would become independent of interest expense and
the bank's leverage. So management and the bank's creditors would not choose
debt levels with the tax bill in mind. It also leads to a low tax rate and comports
with basic preferences for American taxation, namely, to widen the tax base and
lower the tax rate.45 If policymakers wish not to levy the tax on insured deposits,
they need not. If $20 billion of the $28 billion deposit interest went to insured
deposits, then the tax would be levied on $30 billion; the tax rate would be eleven
and two-thirds percent of $30 billion (of profit, before deposit interest), not seven
46percent of $50 billion. Most importantly, it would encourage banks, as
compared to the current tax structure, to substitute away from debt and into
systemically safer equity.
However, ending the deduction for interest for banks has major drawbacks.
First, it will tax them even if their net profit is zero or if they run a loss. This
drawback could be ignored, because banks running losses are systemically
wounded, are risky to the economy, and should shrink further. Alternatively, one
could exempt a net-loss bank.
The second major drawback is that the bank's tax would vary with the level
of interest rates. When interest rates increase, banks' interest income rises, but
so does their interest cost. And the tax bill would decline when interest rates
declined. For a traditional corporate tax, a rising deduction offsets rising interest
income. But, a tax only on the "top-line" gross income, with no offsetting
deduction for its interest expense, would balloon when interest rates rise. Some
mechanism for indexing, perhaps to the inflation rate, would be needed.
45. Stephen E. Shay, Senior Lecturer, Harv. Law Sch., Presentation at the EC-IMF
Conference on Corporate Debt Bias: U.S. Experience with Interest Deductibility Restrictions 32 (Feb. 23-
24, 2015), http://studylib.net/doc/9425959/u.s.-experience-with-interest-deductibility-restrictions
[http://perma.cc/XZA7-BUGN] (applying the concept to interest deduction and ACE). On broadening the
base and cutting the rate, see The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform: A Joint Report by the
White House and the Department of the Treasury, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 1-2 (2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/OTA-Report-Business-Tax-
Reform-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z836-NJDE].
46. A corporate tax at a 3 5% on $10 billion of traditional, after-interest profit yields a
tax bill of $3.5 billion. A tax of 7% on pre-interest income of $50 billion also yields a tax bill of $3.5
billion. A tax of 112/3% on $30 billion of income after deducting only deposit interest paid yields a tax
bill of $3.5 billion.
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Third, ending the deduction may push the newly disfavored debt from the
sector whose tax is reconfigured to elsewhere in the economy. If that elsewhere
is systemically safer, this shift is a benefit; if riskier, it is not. Accordingly, the
specific sorts of debt that would be targeted would need to be thought out.
Hence, while the no-deduction-for-interest solution has conceptual
simplicity in its favor, much work would be needed to make it viable in practice.
III.The Proposal: A Targeted Deduction for Non-Regulatory Bank Equity
Comprehensive corporate tax reform, while desirable, has been
unattainable. Ending the deductibility of interest has conceptual simplicity in its
favor and difficulty in implementation as a weakness. We now come to our
general conceptual proposal: an allowance to the bank, allowing it to deduct the
cost of equity.
A. Deducting the Cost ofBank Equity
The concept, although less intuitive than the other evening-up solutions, is
quite promising: treat equity similarly to debt for tax purposes, by according the
bank an interest-like deduction for the cost of its equity. Conceptually, the firm
"rents" debt for its operations and also "rents" equity. Both rental payments are
costs to the firm.
Financial-oriented readers may think of firms paying up for their "cost of
capital" and that intuition accords well with this tax idea, an allowance for
corporate equity (or ACE): Equity capital, like debt capital, has a cost. Under
traditional corporate taxation, equity's cost is not deductible; with an ACE, it
would be.47
To be sure, our proposal does not depend on precisely calculating the actual
cost of equity. Thus a purist might object. Our proposal is, instead, instrumental,
designed to induce the banks to capitalize with more equity and less debt, with
the net impact on tax revenue from the financial sector approximately neutral.
Moreover, the ACE does not allow banks to deduct dividends paid (which is the
47. The ACE idea was introduced almost simultaneously in Ekkehard Wenger,
Gleichmaj3igkeit der Besteuerung von Arbeits- und Vermagenseinkiinfiten, FINANZARCHIV [PUBLIC FIN.
ANALYSIS] 207 (1983), and in Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, A General Proposition on the Design of a
Neutral Business Tax, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 231 (1984), then developed in Equity for Companies: A
Corporation Tax for the 1990s, IFS CAP. TAXES GRP. (1991), http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm26.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D77R-M8U3], and most recently analyzed in the Mirrlees Review, see DIMENSIONS OF
TAX DESIGN (Stuart Adam et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Mirrlees Review]. For further analysis, see Alvin
C. Warren, The Business Enterprise Income Tax: A First Appraisal, 118 TAX NOTES 921, 921-26 (2008);
Alvin C. Warren, Corporate Cash-Flow Tax Bases (Sept. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); cf Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Integration of Corporate and Shareholder Taxes (SSRN
Working Paper, 2016), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2780490 [http://perma.cc/77JW-JXSK].
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favored reform to remedy the debt-equity imbalance)-a distinction that is a
48
quite important strength of ACE for banks, as we shall discuss further below.
The ACE tax system was developed to reduce investment and financing
distortions in nonfinancial corporations and was not intended for financial
institutions.49 However, the ACE concept can be repurposed for taxation of
financial institutions to reverse the tax subsidy to debt.
Mechanically, in most ACE renditions, the deduction for equity is
calculated by multiplying the book value of equity by a formulaic rate of interest
tied to market rates. The following financial statement illustrates a
straightforward six percent allowance for corporate equity for the running
example of our trillion-dollar bank. The allowance for the cost of the bank's
equity gives the banks a $6 billion deduction for the cost of the bank's $100
billion of equity, which it deducts from its gross operating income alongside its
interest expense. By allowing that $6 billion deduction for the cost of equity, the
bank then has $4 billion of taxable profits, instead of the original $10 billion.
We apply an ACE in our running example, in the next illustration. The ACE
structure is as leverage-neutral as the prior possibility of taxing only pre-interest
operating income, as long as the interest rate on the bank's debt is the same as
percentage equity allowance. (If the interest rate is eight percent but the
allowance is only six percent, then the traditional corporate tax retains a small
advantage; conversely, if the ACE rate is higher than the interest rate, equity
becomes more attractive after taxes than debt.) When the two (the interest rate
and the equity allowance) are equal, then, if the bank decided to increase its
equity and decrease its long-term debt, its overall tax bill would not change,
because the bank would replace deductible debt with newly-deductible equity.
Tax would no longer motivate capital structure. However, the total tax bill
diminishes the proposal is not yet revenue-neutral.
These two income statements for the traditional bank compare results with
and without an allowance for corporate equity. The ACE is calculated as some
function of the long-term U.S. Treasury rates, resulting in a six percent number
here. The book value of equity is accorded a deduction of six percent, or $6
billion. This should make the bank tax-indifferent to debt at 6% or new equity,
but the capital structure of the trillion-dollar bank remains unchanged here, even
after the ACE is introduced. And the tax bill with the ACE is about $2 billion
less than without it; this example's structure is not revenue neutral.
48. As we have alluded before, a deduction for dividends-paid-the reigning reform
idea would devastate the financial system, by encouraging banks to pay out cash to get the tax deduction.
See infra Section IV.C.
49. Setting Savings Free: Proposals for the Taxation ofSavings and Profits, INST. FOR
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Table 4: ACE for traditional bank
Traditional bank's income statement, Income Statement with a 6% Allowance
traditionally taxed for the Cost of Corporate Equity, on
$100 B of equity
50B Gross operating profit 50B Gross operating profit
(income from loans & (income from loans &
investments) investments)
(6B) Bond interest (6B) Bond interest
(6B) Short-term interest (6B) Short-term interest
(28B) Deposit interest (28B) Deposit interest
10B Taxable profit 10B Basic pre-tax profit
(6Bi) ACE 167 0 ofthec
4B Taxable profit
(3.5B) Corporate tax (1.4B Corporate tax
6.5B Net profit 8.6B Net profit
A more realistic rendition would have equity, made relatively cheaper as
compared to debt, increasing while debt, made relatively more expensive,
decreasing. The following example shows how, once an ACE structure is in
place, the bank would not be penalized by increased taxation if it raised its equity
to $200 billion from $100 billion, by replacing $100 billion of old debt with new
equity. Profit increases overall, because shareholders would have more capital
in the bank, while the overall payout to all investors (stockholders and creditors,
together) remains constant. Again, tax would no longer motivate the firm's
choice of capital structure.
We introduce dynamism next. When the bank's debt matures in the prior
example with the ACE in place, it is tax-indifferent to rolling over the debt into
more debt and replacing the old debt with equity. Here it replaces the old debt
with new equity, thereby doubling its equity from ten percent of its trillion-
dollars in total value to twenty percent. The bank loses the $6 billion deduction
for interest paid to the debt that is not rolled over, but requires that deduction via
the allowance for corporate equity for the newly increased equity, which makes
the bank more stable. The two structures are tax-revenue-neutral as between the
ACE with no equity increase and ACE with a major increase in equity. But
neither is revenue neutral when compared to the current system. Both reduce the
bank's tax bill.
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Table 5: Expected Impact of the Allowance for Corporate Equity: More Equity
Tax-induced transformation of $1 trillion bank balance sheet
Loans & investments $1000B 10OB bonds at 6-%-retired or not renewed
100B short-term debt at 6%
700B deposits at 4%
100B original equity + 100B new equity
ACE Income Statement for the $1 00B-equity
bank, with no change in capital structure
ACE Income Statement for
$200B-equity bank
Gross operating profit (income





ACE at 6% for $100B equity
Taxable profit
Corporate tax
















14.6B Net after-tax profit for
shareholders
34B Income to creditors
$48.6B Total investor income
This allowance mechanism has a very basic disadvantage: in isolation, it
would reduce bank taxes greatly. The political headline of a bank-specific
allowance for corporate equity might be that the banks would be favored with a
deduction for profits that should be taxed. Or lobbying by banks may yield no
offset to the allowance and lowered tax bill. (As in, "Thank you for the deduction
for equity; but let's just stop there., 5 0 )
In our running example, the bank would pay only $1.4 billion in tax with
an allowance for equity, instead of the $3.5 billion from a traditional tax.
Revenue neutrality would require $2.1 billion from elsewhere in the financial
system.
50. Critics would argue that the tax system encouraged risky banker behavior.
Policymakers should not give bankers a gift of more deductions for equity, but a penalty. Lost in the
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Before we achieve that revenue neutrality, we shall first show that most of
the safety advantage can be obtained without according banks the full allowance
for the cost of equity, but rather targeting it at the bank's equity above the
regulatory-required level. This will greatly reduce the make-up needed for
revenue neutrality. We thus now come to our central proposal.
B. Deducting the Cost ofNon-Regulatory Bank Equity
Consider allowing banks to deduct their cost of corporate equity for only
that portion of equity exceeding the regulatory minimum. The authorities would
thereby not give banks a windfall tax benefit for equity that they must have in
any case. The tax authorities would not need to search as far and wide for
offsetting limits that would maintain tax revenue neutrality.
Table 6: Incremental ACE Reduces Total Tax Bill Less Than Full ACE
Bank's income statement with ACE on
$100B in equity


































Here, the allowance for corporate equity is allowed only on equity above the regulatory-required amount
(which we assume here to be 8%, or $80 billion for the $1 trillion bank). The revenue loss from the non-
regulatory ACE is much less than that of the ACE when available for all equity. Instead of a $2 billion
revenue loss, the loss is $400 million, which would be easier to offset with a tax elsewhere in the financial
system.
Suppose that the required regulatory minimum equity is eight percent of
assets. The $1 trillion bank in the running illustration has $100 billion of equity,
meaning that it has $20 billion of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum.
The minimally disruptive allowance is to allow it to deduct the same percentage
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That would yield the bank a $1.2 billion deduction, which would decrease
its tax by $400 million instead of the $2.2 billion from an allowance for all
equity.
Without the ACE, the bank would have paid $3.5 billion in taxes (from a
tax rate of thirty-five percent on $10 billion of traditionally-calculated after-
interest profit). The lost $400 million of tax revenue can be made up via a low
.04% levy on the bank's full $1 trillion of assets.5 ' Or the make-up could target
the riskiest forms of short-term debt spread throughout the financial system,
which is the offset we prefer.
Revenue-neutrality could alternatively be achieved by limiting the
deductibility of the bank's interest payments to the risk-free rate, proxied by the
rate on U.S. Treasuries of the same duration as the bank debt.52 Low-risk banks
borrow at a rate approximating that on U.S. Treasuries; they could deduct most
of their interest paid. As a bank took on more debt and more risk, its borrowing
cost would rise, but the tax allowance would not. Such a well-designed tax
53
system would thereby penalize the riskier bank and reward the safer one.
We emphasize that by favorably taxing the slice of equity above what
regulation requires, the authorities would not be favoring a random slice of
equity with no more than a weak impact on safety-increasing equity. The
authorities would be favoring the "marginal," extra equity above that which is
already required. The income on every dollar of extra equity would be tax-free,
or nearly so. This allowance can be grafted onto the current tax structure for
financial firms without reconstructing the taxation of all of corporate America.
It would reward banks for building up more safe equity on top of what regulators
already require.
The authorities can also adapt the incentives to obtain the best debt-equity
mix. By raising or lowering the size of the allowance for the cost of equity, and
any corresponding tax offset to achieve revenue neutrality, the authorities could
modulate the after-tax benefit of equity and debt. If the authorities wanted more
equity, they would raise the relative ACE benefit and limit the deduction for
interest.
51. Our core proposal thus parts company with Allen's approach, supra note 15, at 875-
83, 886-87, which seeks an ACE-like deduction for regulatory capital and perhaps more. In our view,
leaving disadvantaged the slice that regulators already require is not systemically damaging and focusing
only on the incremental slice yields wider offset options.
52. Edward Kleinbard, Designing an Income Tax on Capital, in TAXING CAPITAL
INCOME 180-82 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007); Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, A General Proposition
on the Design of a Neutral Business Tax, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 231, 237-38 (1984); Edward D. Kleinbard,
Beyond Good and Evil Debt (and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943,
946, 955-61 (1989).
53. Cf Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate Meltdowns and the Deduction of Credit-Risk
Interest, 131 TAX NOTES 513, 513 (2011) (recommending that there be no deduction for the risk
component of the interest paid).
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Four major objections must be overcome for the proposal to be viable. First,
does the tax advantage of debt have major corporate governance benefits that our
reform would eliminate? Second, would banks take up the tax incentives and
build up more systemically safe equity? Third, would the players game the new
system and defeat it? Fourth, would the banks' cost of finance rise so that the
economy would be damaged? In the following Parts we address these objections.
None seriously undermines the proposal.
IV. Will It Work?: Taxing Banks Properly as Corporate Governance Strategy
In this Part we examine the first major objection to the targeted proposal,
looking at the bank tax issue through the analytic lens of corporate governance
and organizational efficiency. We make critical points that have not yet been
highlighted for bank tax reform: while the pro-debt tax bias has important
mitigating positive benefits for industrial firms, these benefits are missing for
banks. Worse yet, as we pointed out above, the most prominent corporate tax
"fix"-a deduction for corporate dividend payments-would reduce bank safety
greatly, necessitating a sharply different tax reform for financial firms.
A. Shareholder-Manager Agency Cost Benefits for Industry
The large public firm has two core corporate governance conflicts: (1)
between senior executives and stockholders and (2) between debt and equity.
More debt reduces the first conflict but exacerbates the second. Because
industrial firms typically have much less debt than banks, the first conflict should
be more pernicious for them while the second will be more important for banks.
The conflict between executives and stockholders in industrial firms arises
because executives have slack, since stockholders in the public firm are
insufficiently cohesive, attentive, and powerful to hold managers tightly
accountable for failing to produce corporate value. Heavily increasing debt in an
industrial firm tightens that slack, because the managers must then produce
enough cash to pay the debt. If they fail to pay, unforgiving creditors have
remedies that stockholders lack. Hence, traditional thinking has it that managers
scramble to meet debt payments more earnestly than to satisfy stockholders.54
The point is not that agency costs justify debt's deductibility for industrial
firms but that for industrial firms there is a mitigating benefit that reduces the
cost of the tax distortion for them, but, as we see next, not for financial firms.
For banks, no such mitigating benefit from debt's tax benefit is in play,
because banks have much more debt than industrial firms and will remain
heavily indebted even if tax equalization raises equity levels. Industrial firm debt
54. Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux & Helen Simpson, Taxing Corporate
Income, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN 837, 858 (Stuart Adam et al. eds., 2010); Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323-24
(1986).
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in developed nations typically averages between ten and thirty percent of assets,
while bank debt is typically more than ninety percent of the bank's overall
value.5 5 If there's a corporate governance shareholder-oriented benefit from debt,
it's already well embedded in bank capital structures.
B. Debt-Equity Agency Cost Degradation for Banks
Given the high leverage inherent in financial firms, the main agency-cost,
corporate-governance conflict in banks is between debt and equity, more so than
that between executives and stockholders. As the bank's equity level declines,
stockholders have reason to increase the riskiness of their operation because the
stockholders enjoy the upside if the risks pay off, but are not fully exposed to the
downside because of corporate limited liability: they can only lose their
56investment. This conflict is well known and empirically documented. Thinly
capitalized banks took on more risk and did worse during the financial crisis than
better capitalized banks.
Can these private creditors contribute to better corporate governance?
Active creditors can play a positive role in industrial firm corporate governance
but are unlikely to do so in banks. Banks' non-deposit financial creditors know
that the regulator is the bank's biggest de facto creditor (via government
guarantees of deposits and too-big-to-fail government bailout expectations),
which weakens private creditors' incentives and capacities as corporate
governance players. They know that (1) their incentives are similar to those of
the regulators who are de facto creditors of the bank (so, why bother duplicating
the government's work?) and (2) they, the private creditors, cannot readily
displace the regulators if the two disagree.
In addition, (3) much of the financial firm's debt is owed to short-term
creditors who do not participate in bank governance but instead refuse to re-lend
when a bank shows weakness. Lastly, (4) banks are notoriously opaque,5 so that
serious governance requires a boardroom position, which is awkward for bond
creditors and inconceivable for depositors and overnight lenders that finance so
much of modem financial firms' debt.
55. Raghuran G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know About Capital Structure?
Some Evidence from International Data, 50 J. FIN. 1421, 1430 (1995). For banks, see Bank Capital to
Assets Ratio, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.BNK.CAPA.ZS [http://perma.cc
/HMN5-C9JD].
56. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 459.
57. See Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 1, at 6, 8, 16; Daniel Ferreira, David Kershaw,
Tom Kirchmaier & Edmund Schuster, Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts (London Sch. Econ.
Working Paper, 2012), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2170392 [http://perma.cc/3ZEJ-DRJP]; cf John
Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35 (2014).
58. Mark J. Flannery, Simon H. Kwan & Mahendrarajah Nimalendran, The 2007-2009
Financial Crisis and Bank Opaqueness, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 55 (2013).
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C. Corporate Governance Debilities in Banks: Why Existing Tax Proposals
Failfor Banks
Industrial conglomerates that have grown too bulky face internal and
external corporate pressures to resize. Executive compensation, board direction,
and shareholder action all can press in this direction. But large, heavily indebted,
and equally bulky banks lack major governance correctives when the too-big-to-
fail funding advantages are large and a downsized financial firm would lose that
too-big-to-fail funding advantage. Once the bank downsizes, it may still stumble
but it would no longer be too big to fail.59
Moreover, we have effective means to restructure failed industrial firms,
namely, chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. But failed financial firms are still
regularly bailed out.60 Reversing the tax bias would reduce these corporate
governance debilities in banks.
With corporate governance in mind, we can better evaluate proposed
mechanisms to even up the tax impact of debt and equity.
A deduction for dividends paid-corporate tax reformers' favorite-would
bolster industrial firms' corporate governance by incentivizing them to pay out
cash, which industrial firm executives prefer to retain at excessive levels.61 But
it would cause havoc for banks: by pushing them to pay cash out, it would push
them to reduce their retained equity, which is their fundamental cushion of
safety. Financial reformers should want a corporate tax that does the opposite for
the financial sector, incentivizing financial firms to retain earnings to bolster
equity levels. We will need a different system for evening up debt and equity
taxation in industry and in finance, such as the allowance for corporate equity
62
above the regulatory required amount, as outlined in the previous Part.
59. See Roe, supra note 15, at 1428-31.
60. Jeffrey M. Chwieroth & Andrew Walter, Policy Responses to Banking Crises over
the Longer Run (SSRN Working Paper, 2015), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2715468 [http://perma.cc
/JPA9-GAV6].
61. Amy Dittmar, Jan Mahrt-Smith & Henri Servaes, International Corporate
Governance and Corporate Cash Holding, 38 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 111, 116-117 (2003); Jensen,
supra note 54, at 324.
62. One might mistakenly think that the allowance for corporate equity approximates
the proposed dividend deduction. But the differences are quite large. Under the reigning proposals, the
firm cannot get a deduction for equity unless it pays a dividend and reduces its cash; thus the proposals
motivate firms to declare dividends that push cash out from the firm. The ACE proposal is neutral on
dividend payouts; the firm can keep the cash or not; either way it gets the tax benefit.
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V. Will It Work?: Would Reducing Tax Distortion Change Banks' Capital
Structure?
We examine in this Part whether banks would take up the incentives and
build up more systemically safe equity. The core tradeoff theory of capital
structure63 has the choice between debt and equity by executives and their
financiers balancing the costs of high debt (mainly from the risk of bankruptcy)
64
against the tax benefits from interest's deductibility. A reduction in the tax
advantage increases the relative size of bankruptcy costs and should therefore
lead to an increase in equity. However, additional factors determine debt levels
and capital structure for banks: The business of banking is managing liabilities
and profitably matching them to the bank's loans. Hence, banks will have much
debt regardless of how they are taxed. It is plausible in theory that tax incentives
could have only a weak effect on banks' leverage decisions.
Only analysis of the data can settle this question. Fortunately, there are now
multiple, recent empirical studies demonstrating that, even if the tax-versus-
bankruptcy "tradeoff" theory does not apply to all of the typical bank's debt, it
still strongly influences a bank's capital structure choice. The tax effect from an
ACE may not drive bank equity toward thirty or fifty percent of the bank assets,
but it has an impact on the whether the bank chooses the pre-crisis four percent,
the current eight percent, or a safer fifteen percent level for its equity. We report
and discuss this empirical evidence in the following sections.
A. The Overall Evidence: Tax Incentives Change Banks' Capital Structure
Table 7 summarizes all studies since 2010 that examine the effect of taxes
65
on bank capital structure. Most studies observe change in capital structure and
63. See Alan Kraus & Robert H. Litzenberger, A State- preference Model of Optimal
Financial Leverage, 28 J. FIN. 911 (1973); James H. Scott, Jr., A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 7
BELL J. ECON. 33 (1976).
64. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 18-25; Modigliani & Miller, supra note 13;
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 263 (1958).
65. Sources: Grace Weishi Gu, Ruud de Mooij & Tigran Poghosyan, Taxation and
Leverage in International Banking, 22 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 177, 184 (2015) (row 1); De Ruud de Mooij
& Michael Keen, Debt, Taxes, andBanks, 48 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 5,21 (2016) (row 2); Thomas
Hemmelgarn & Daniel Teichmann, Tax Reforms and Capital Structure of Banks, 21 INT'L TAX & PUB.
FIN. 649 (2014) (row 3); Kristoffer Milonas, Bank Taxes, Leverage, and Risk, J. FIN. SERV. RES. 1, 1
(2016); Alexander Schandlbauer, How Do Financial Institutions React To a Tax Increase?, 30 J. ON FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 86, 98 (2017) (row 5); Glenn Schepens, Taxes and Bank Capital Structure, 120 J. FIN.
ECON. 585, 592 (2016) (row 6); C6l6rier et al., supra note 14, at 15 (rows 7 and 11); Steve Bond et al.,
Regulation, Tax and Capital Structure: Evidence from Administrative Data on Italian Banks 46, tbl. 3,
col. 3 (Banca d'Italia Working Paper No. 361, 2016), http://www.researchgate.net/publication
/309234582 Regulation tax andcapital structureevidencefrom administrativedataonItalian
banks [http://perma.cc/HD6L-LVAD] (row 8); Leonardo Gambacorta et al., The Effects of Tax on Bank
Liability Structure 4 (BIS Working Paper No. 611, 2017), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2923758
[http://perma.cc/V7GB-3QTD] (row 9); Jose Martin-Flores & Christophe Moussu, Is Bank Capital
Sensitive to a Tax Allowance on Marginal Equity? 2 (ESCP Europe Working Paper, 2017),
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debt levels after corporate tax rates change; some studies focus on a single
nation, some examine several. Other studies measure the impact of introducing
special taxes that allow interest paid to be deducted. This deduction for interest
makes debt more valuable to the firm; researchers extrapolate from the change
in debt levels how the tax leads to more debt. Three studies examine the effect
of an ACE in Belgium and Italy.
All studies confirm that banks' capital structure choices include a tradeoff
of tax benefits for other costs. In every study, banks capital structure changes in
the direction theory predicts.
Table 7: Impact of Debt-Equity Tax Neutrality on Bank Equity Levels
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This table summarizes post-2010 studies of the relationship between corporate tax rates and equity levels
in banks. Similar samples are grouped and averaged. A linear extrapolation from the studies, when
averaged, predicts a 6% increase in total equity from eliminating the tax benefit of tax that the American
corporate tax creates. That is, a bank whose equity was 4% of its assets would by extrapolation have equity
at 10% of assets, according to the banking-only studies.
Several studies also provided additional evidence and caveats: Some
studies see the tax-incentive impact as strongest for smaller and already-better
66
capitalized banks, with already highly leveraged banks unable or unwilling to
increase their equity. And while tax increases are consistently followed by higher
leverage, some tax decreases are not followed by similarly sized leverage
decreases. The immediate effects in some studies are smaller than the more maj or
longer-term effects. And several studies show that banks (in those studies)
increase equity by decreasing cash dividends and long-term financial debt.
B. Extrapolating the Proposal's Impact on American Banks
Overall, the results indicate that our proposal would roughly double bank
equity from pre-crisis levels, which would be quite substantial.
To get to that rough estimate of a predicted 6% increase in equity, we
extrapolated from each study's results the impact of ending the American
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66. de Mooij & Keen, supra note 65, at 21; Gu et al., supra note 66, at 184.
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corporate tax bias for debt over equity. Then we averaged the results; several
studies analyzed the same event, such as the impact of the Belgian ACE. For
these we averaged the multiple studies for a single estimate. We assumed that
the ACE we propose would lead to the same capital structure changes as
eliminating the corporate tax (because new equity would incur no tax). Thus if
the study showed the increased equity from a ten percent tax decrease, we
extrapolated the result linearly to estimate the impact on capital structure of a
zero marginal tax on equity (i.e., we multiply the impact by 3.5, to reach today's
corporate tax rate).
An example: The International Monetary Fund study covering 82 countries
shows that decreasing the corporate tax rate by 10% leads to bank equity
67increasing by nearly 1% in the short run and 2.7% in the longer run. A linear
extrapolation has ending the American 35% corporate tax increasing bank capital
3.5 x 2.7%, or about 9.5% .68 This increase would rival the impact on equity levels
of all post-2008 crisis efforts to increase bank equity.
True, banks may not adjust their capital structure to tax changes linearly
with the size of the tax incentive. In the short run, while the observed changes in
capital structure are all directionally positive, their size seems not to depend
much on the strength of the tax incentive. Two explanations come to mind for
this impact. First, the impact might not be directly proportional; differently-sized
tax changes could have different nonlinear impacts. But, secondly, banks may
not adjust quickly. Large changes in capital structure are difficult to implement
quickly; banks are accustomed to doing business in a particular way, so initial
adjustments are small and tentative. But long-run changes need not be small and
tentative; they could well fit the linear assumptions. Several studies indicate that
better capitalized banks also react more to tax incentives, so, once initial small
adjustments have pushed up equity levels, further adjustments might accelerate.
Overall a linear approximation seems the best estimate; even when including the
small, short-term adjustments that were cut short (because the reforms were
terminated), the average is at 6%-longer-term results may well be and should
be higher- but the margin of error here is large.
A linear approximation also allows us to scale our results and generate
simple predictions for how banks should react to partial tax reductions. For
example, the year-end 2017 reduction of the corporate tax rate to 21 percent
should lead American banks to prefer 2.4% more equity in the long-run than they
67. de Mooij & Keen, supra note 65, at 21 ("[T]he tax effect on the leverage ratio is
positive and ... large."); see also Hemmelgarn & Teichmann, supra note 65, at 645 (finding that each
10% of corporate tax "result[s] in an increase of leverage of ... 1.04 [percent] in the long-run, with a
[full] adjustment period [of] 3.85 years"); Michael P. Devereux, Giorgia Maffini & Jing Xing, Corporate
Tax Incentives and Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence from UK Tax Returns (Oxford Ctr. for Bus.
Taxation Working Paper 15/07, 2015), http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/BusinessTaxation
/Docs/Publications/Working Papers/Series_15/WPl507.pdf[http://perma.cc/C95P-PA7R].
68. In cases where this simple extrapolation was not possible, we made similar rough
approximations. For example, Schandlbauer, supra note 65, analyzes the effect of tax increases and
decreases separately. We averaged the two observed effects.
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currently prefer. (Calculated by taking the 6% average in Table 7, based on the
long-standing 35% corporate tax rate and scaling it to the amended rate: 6%
*
2 1%/ 3 5%= 2 .4% of assets.)
Remarkably, none of the tax reforms, whose impact on bank capital was
the subject of these studies, was intended to push bank equity up; better bank
equity was a side effect. A reform specifically aimed to make equity more tax
attractive should achieve much higher reactions.
The Belgian reform bears comment. Belgium changed its overall corporate
tax system-not just bank taxation-in 2006 to be neutral between debt and
equity via a mechanism that is analytically a cousin to that which we propose.
European banks' equity levels were falling then. After the change, equity in
69Belgian banks rose, while it continued to fall in comparable European banks.
The graphic illustrates.70
Figure 1: Evolution of the Equity Ratio for the Belgian Banks and a Control
Group of Banks
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Belgian banks Control banks
The reform's positive effect on bank capital is surprising as its purpose was
not to strengthen financial stability; accordingly, it was badly structured for this
purpose. (It aimed to make Belgium an attractive locale for corporate activity.7 1 )
The reform favored the equity that the Belgian bank itself had, but not the equity
of the Belgian bank's often larger foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. Moreover,
the tax boost to equity was netted against other tax advantages, making it less
69. Glenn Schepens, Taxes and Bank Capital Structure, 120 J. FIN. ECON. 585,
585-86 (2016).
70. Id at 586 fig. 1. Doubts about the reform's durability weakened its impact. It was
passed by a very small majority and has been regularly challenged. It survived but concessions were made
to opponents, reducing the benefit to equity.
71. Savina Princen, Determining the Impact of Taxation on Corporate Financial
Decision-Making, 51 REFLETS ET PERSPECTIVES DE LAVIE ECONOMIQUE 161-70(2012); Schepens, supra
note 65, at 588.
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efficacious for financial safety purposes. And Belgium after only a few years cut
back the reform,72 which was seen as too advantageous for multinationals 7 3 and
did "not seem to boost the economy or serve any employment objective, [thus]
undermin[ing] its value in the eyes of the public."74
Thus, although Belgium's equity-favoring reform persists, as we write, it
has been weakened such that it no longer has a major impact on correcting the
debt-equity imbalance. Despite its weaknesses, its initial impact was
directionally aligned with promoting bank safety and, given its short effective
duration, substantial.
Similar weaknesses afflicted the ACE that Italy introduced in 1997 for non-
financial firms and then extended to banks in 2000, but revoked in 2002 due to
governmental revenue concerns. The reform was weak, in that the notional "cost
of equity" was not fully deductible, but instead taxed at a nineteen percent rate
instead of the ordinary thirty-seven percent rate. Still, the measured impact of
this short-lived and badly structured reform on bank capital structure was
directionally to make the banks safer and its size was not negligible.
72. Id. at 168. Because the Belgian ACE applied to all corporations and on all of their
equity, the ACE reform significantly and adversely affected government revenue, which a revenue-hungry
government later sought to reverse. By 2017, the allowed deduction for equity was down in Belgium to a
very low .237%, less than one-tenth the rate on long-term government bonds. Des interts notionnels au
plus bas en 2017, c'est jackpot pour l'Etat, RTL INFO (Sept. 21, 2016) http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique
/economie/des-interets-notionnels-au-plus-bas-en-2017-c-est-jackpot-pour-l-etat-852661.aspx
[http://perma.cc/T57N-RET3]. For the cutbacks, see Art. 132 Loi-programme [General Act] of Dec. 23,
2009, MONITEURBELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium] Dec. 30, 2009, 82.3 10; Art. 45 Loi portant
des dispositions diverses [Miscellaneous Provisions Act] of Dec. 28, 2011, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Dec. 30, 2011, ed. 4, 81.644; Art. 48 and 56 of the Loi portant des
dispositions fiscales et financi&es [Fiscal and Financial Provisions Act] of Dec. 13, 2012, MONITEUR
BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Dec. 20, 2012, ed. 4, 86.373; Art. 46 Loi portant des
dispositions diverses [Miscellaneous Provisions Act] of July 30, 2013, MONITEURBELGE [M.B.] [Official
Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 1, 2013, ed. 2, 48.270.
73. Princen, supra note 71, at 168.
74. Savina Princen, Taxes Do Affect Corporate Financing Decisions: The Case of
Belgian ACE 15 (CESifo Working Paper No. 3713, Jan. 2012), http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps
/3713.html [http://perma.cc/F3Q2-DSQT]. Dexia, a major Belgian-French bank, failed during the
financial crisis. Had Belgium's 2006 equity-friendly tax been stronger, implemented earlier, targeted to
making banks safer, and covered the bank's international operations, perhaps the bank could have better
weathered the financial crisis. The Belgian ACE tax law is only for equity of the Belgian firm, not its
foreign subsidiaries. Cf Rapport Annuel 2008, DEXIA51 (2008), http://www.dexia.com/FR/actionnaires
investisseurs/actionnaires individuels/publications/Documents/rapport annuel_2008_fr.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UY4H-TNKQ]. In 2008, when Belgium's allowance for corporate equity was more than
4%, instead of Dexia getting a reduction of 4% of its 16 billion euros of equity, it obtained a benefit
corresponding to only a 1% allowance. The allowance was offset by other tax benefits and rules restricting
application to non-Belgian lines of the bank's operations. (By the time the crisis hit, not only was the
Belgian tax reform's future in doubt, but banks suffering significant operating losses, which result in tax
deductions and a low tax rate (or no corporate tax payment at all), would have had no incentive to increase
equity, even if a more equity-friendly tax was in place.)
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Complementary empirical evidence exists. After several European nations
added small levies on bank borrowing, their banks borrowed less. Reductions
in the personal-level taxation of equity in 2003 in the United States led overall
76
corporate leverage to decrease. Moreover, the American bank tax history is
consistent. Between 1947 and the mid-70s, U.S. banks were allowed to build
reserves for loan losses that far exceeded the banks' actual losses. These reserves
reduced bank taxable income and effectively became bank equity, until the bank
reversed the reserve. Banks responded to these tax incentives by accumulating
large reserves, adding additional capital corresponding to about two percent of
loans .
For completeness and a check, we also compiled all post-2010 studies of
the tax impact on non-bank firms' debt levels. Their reaction to tax incentives,
summarized in Table 2, was of the same general magnitude as that for banks.
Banks may well be different than industrial firms, because banks' business
means they will naturally have higher leverage than industry. But the roughly
similar incremental results strongly suggest that, whatever the baseline
preference for debt over equity is for the two, capital structures for both are on
the margin shaped by the same factors and can be influenced by the same
-78incentives.
The studies focus on the period just before the financial crisis, after which
regulators raised required capital. 79 Hence, when bank capital was 4%, the bank
studies on average indicate that better taxation of equity could raise that equity
level by 6% to 10%. But with capital now at about 7 or 8%, only 3 % is left from
that original 10%. That is, better taxation would just induce the banks to
acquiesce in the current levels, and perhaps add 3%.
75. Michael Devereux, Niels Johannesen & John Vella, Can Taxes Tame the Banks?
Evidence from European Bank Levies (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation Working Paper No. 1325,
2013), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract id=2563634 [http://perma.cc/MQ4J-CCEH].
76. Leming Lin & Mark J. Flannery, Do Personal Taxes Affect Capital Structure?
Evidence from the 2003 Tax Cut, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 549, 549-50 (2013) (observing that a decline in
maximum tax on dividends of 23.6% and on capital gains of five percent led to decline in leverage of five
percent for firms in which the marginal investor was an individual).
77. See John R. Walter, Loan Loss Reserves, 77 FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON.
REV. 20, 24 (1991).
78. Sources: Florian Heider & Alexander Ljungqvist, As Certain as Debt and Taxes:
Estimating the Tax Sensitivity of Leverage from State Tax Changes, 118 J. FIN. ECON. 684, 687 (2015)
(row 1); Frederic Panier et al., Capital Structure and Taxes: What Happens When You Also Subsidize
Equity? 20 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (row 2); Mara Faccio & Jin Xu, Taxes
and Capital Structure, 50 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 277, 279 (2015) (row 3); Devereux et al., supra note 67,
at 17 (row 4); Michael Faulkender & Jason M. Smith, Taxes andLeverage at Multinational Corporations,
122 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 13 (2016) (row 5); Craig Doidge & Alexander Dyck, Taxes and Corporate Policies:
Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment, 70 J. FIN. 45, 48 (2015) (row 6).
79. See Dagher et al., supra note 20.
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Table 8: Impact of Debt-Equity Neutrality on Non-Bank Equity Levels
Study Companies Scope of
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This table summarizes post-2010 studies of the relationship between corporate tax rates and equity levels
of non-financial firms. A linear extrapolation from the six studies predicts a 14.8% increase in equity by
eliminating the tax benefit to debt in the United States.
But three considerations largely erase this reservation. First, an additional
3% in capital is not small. Second, inducing acquiescence is also not a small
benefit. Banks are readying to militate for a cutback in required capital, so as to
allow more bank stock buybacks and decapitalization.s0 Third, an incentivize-
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80. Ben McLannahan, Biggest US Banks Have More than $120bn of Excess' Capital,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.ft.com/content/dc7f7f66-ed83-11e6-930f-061b01e23655
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compatible move from, say, 4% to 10% would establish a new base on which
command-and-control rules could further increase capital; that is, if command-
and-control can only get the banks an additional 4%, better taxation of equity
could make that 4% an add-on to 10%, instead of an add-on to 4%.
Overall, although the actual tax rate changes studied are small and not
designed to increase bank equity, they lead to noticeable changes in equity in
both banks and in non-bank firms. If a full-scale regulatory tax effort were
implemented, larger effects than those now seen could be anticipated, perhaps
reaching a level beyond that which is thought viable via command-and-control
regulation.
VI. Will It Work?: Tax Arbitrage and the Cost of Finance
A. Increases and Decreases in Tax Arbitrage from an ACE on Non-Regulatory
Equity
Financial firms will game the proposed allowance, but the extent of such
tax arbitrage (to use the tax jargon) can be exaggerated. Different types of
financial institutions are already taxed differently.8' The proposal here will add
to tax differentiation, but not create it. Moreover, because the proposal would tax
debt and equity more symmetrically than they are now taxed, the changes will
reduce adjacent gaming and boundary problems that now occur. Many of today's
tax arbitrage strategies exploit the tax deductibility of interest82 and raise
systemic risk. Arbitraging safety rules today is quite plausibly more dangerous
than arbitraging the marginal-ACE tax bill tomorrow.
1. Tax Arbitrage Today Via Hybrid Instruments
Taxpayers' tax planning strategies now blur the distinction between debt
and equity, in order to create loss-absorbing, risk-bearing securities that are tax
deductible. A leverage-neutral tax system will render these arbitrage strategies
pointless.
[http://perma.cc/26ZZ-J3BR]. For further support, see the comments of the leaders of JPMorgan Chase
and Goldman Sachs. American Banks Think They Are Over-Regulated, supra note 10.
81. For insurance companies, see Subchapter L of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C.
§§ 801-848 (2012); for mutual funds, Subchapter M, I.R.C. §§ 851-860H; for savings banks, Subchapter
H, Pt. II, id. §§ 591-601. Commercial banks are already taxed differently than industrial firms via
Subchapter H, Pt. I, id. §§ 581-586. And other nonregulated financial firms, such as hedge funds and
private equity firms, can organize themselves as Subchapter K partnerships, which are taxed differently
than corporations. See id. §§ 701-77.
82. Richard Rubin, Businesses Say Proposed Tax Rule Is Too Complicated, WALL ST.
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2. Tax Arbitrage Today Between Different Corporate Forms
Tax arbitrage between different financial channels boosts the so-called
"shadow banking" sector, which moves currently taxed bank operations into tax-
favored entities. Firms and savers with cash can "deposit" that cash in non-taxed
money market funds instead of in banks; those money market funds in turn lend
to industrial firms by buying the firms' debts. They thereby provide a banking
function that is taxed differently from, and less than, the traditional banking
channel.
And banks can arrange a long-term loan to an industrial firm; left on the
bank's books, the loan income would be taxed to the bank. But the bank can pool
such loans, place them into a separate trust or partnership that pays no tax
directly, and then sell off ownership in the pool to investors.
Overall, to compete with these loan pools and money market funds directly,
the bank is incentivized to "zero out" its tax bill by offsetting its taxable interest
income on loans with an interest deduction on the bank's own borrowing to
finance the loans. Bank equity undermines zeroing out and renders the banks less
able to compete with the more favorably taxed "shadow banking" sector. The
allowance for corporate equity will narrow the difference between the shadow
and traditional banking sectors. This narrowing will reduce tax arbitrage.
Regulators worry that too many financial activities have moved into "shadow
banking," beyond regulatory reach.83 Evening up the tax differences between the
two will reduce the incentives for migration.
3. International Arbitrage
Multinational firms can shift income to less-taxed jurisdictions.84
Multinational banks operating globally can minimize their tax bill by allocating
their debt and equity to the jurisdiction where each is taxed least.
This type of arbitrage should benefit countries that initiate the allowance
for non-regulatory equity: Banks with low leverage should move to this country
while banks with high leverage seek to be taxed elsewhere. Multinational banks
will be incentivized to lodge debt in an affiliate taxed by a nation where interest
is fully deductible and move debt away from the equity-favoring authorities.
83. Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Speech at the
Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute Conference, Washington D.C.: Shadow
Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm [http://perma.cc/YWA8-7FBA]. Tarullo was a governor of the Federal
Reserve with principal responsibility for regulatory matters.
84. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in
the United States and Beyond, 69 NAT'L TAX J. 905 (2016).
85. See Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Interest Deductions in a
Multijurisdictional World, 68 NAT'L TAX J. 653 (2015).
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This tax arbitrage would stabilize the initiating nation. Coordinated
international tax reform might ensue, yielding a self-sustaining coordination as
most nations converge on the same unbiased tax system for banks.
4. Interaction Between Taxation and Regulation
If the ACE tied directly to regulatory-required equity levels, then whenever
regulators changed that level, they would also determine the tax bill for the
regulated. For bank regulators to determine the tax bill would be an odd result.
Moreover, the interaction between taxation and regulation would create
peculiar incentives. If the regulator raised the required equity, then the regulator
would be raising the banks' tax bill. The first effect of increased equity would
make the banks safer; the second effect, from an increased tax bill, would not.
Analogously, banks would have an added reason to induce lower required equity
levels. Lower levels would be taxed more favorably than higher requirements.
Fiscal authorities seeking new revenue would conversely intermittently want to
raise the required equity level, which would raise more revenue for the
government.
Administrability and dampening of these potentially perverse incentives
could be achieved by fixing the level at which the ACE kicks in at the time the
allowance was implemented. Thus, the allowance would be available for bank
equity above, say, eight percent of total assets, even if regulation changes later.
But economic, financial, and regulatory reality change over time-the
economy's financial system may morph in a major way, new regulation may be
needed in a decade, tax rules may change, or even higher equity levels should be
required. Hence, the incremental ACE, while initially simple, could become
cumbersome to adjust to new realities. The ideal threshold might be chosen
today, but later changes in finance or the economy could lead to that threshold
being noticeably too high or too low. Yet, change could then become sticky. This
is a real, but secondary implementation issue. This problem of divergence
between rates and reality though afflicts most tax rules that involve thresholds,
such as the very basic and pervasive income taxation via progressive income
brackets.
5. Artificial Changes in Equity
Another tax reduction strategy that ACE potentially permits is for the ACE-
taxed firm to create fictitious equity. A bank invests in the equity of a subsidiary
and then the subsidiary invests this money back in equity of the bank. The net
cash balance of the offsetting equity investments is zero, but the circular
transaction allows the bank to present deductible equity at the parent level to the
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tax authorities. This tax gambit requires a countermeasure that zeroes the two
out when calculating the allowance.86
6. The Inevitability of Arbitrage
Nevertheless, if banks are taxed differently than industrial firms, players
will move some transactions from the industrial sector to the financial sector,
and vice versa. Regulatory activity restrictions on banks will reduce but not
eliminate such shifts. And regulatory capital is typically demanded when the
bank takes on new assets and a new activity; the ACE we propose only softens
the taxation of capital above the level that regulators require. For example, for
fee-based financial businesses, debt is not as integral to their business as it is for
banks, whose core business is to transform short-term debt into long-term loans.
A bank with untaxed equity above the regulatory minimum would be tempted to
acquire and expand fee-based financial businesses, because they would
effectively be untaxed. One can imagine Citigroup's ACE incentivizing it to
acquire Fidelity. The authorities would need to keep those fee-based businesses
in traditionally-taxed affiliates.
Wise design can reduce arbitrage. First, the allowance for equity should
apply to a wide array of financial firms: not just commercial and investment
banks, but also other financial firms that are taxed as corporations and subject to
capital adequacy regulation, such as insurance firms, other financial firms, and
87
asset managers. (Private equity funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds are
generally not taxed as corporations and are thus unaffected.) Begin with the
banks, but do not end with them.
Second, the offsetting limit to interest deductibility should target, either
entirely or in major part, a sector-wide financial instrument. This tax should
resist activity shifting because it's the instrument that is taxed, not the institution.
For example, if the offsetting tax was on short-term repurchase agreements
(which are seen by many as an unstable part of the financial system) wherever
held (as opposed to just those held by banks), the incentive to move these
instruments from banks to the less-regulated shadow banking sector would
diminish.
86. The circular investment problem and the Belgian and Italian resolution are analyzed
in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD TAX POLICY STUDIES: TAX POLICY REFORM AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH (2010); Shafik Hebous & Martin Ruf, Evaluating the Effects ofACE Systems on
Multinational Debt Financing and Investment (CESifo Working Paper No. 5360, 2015),
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/ 5360.html [http://perma.cc/QG8S-YHJN]; Ernesto Zangari,
Addressing the Debt Bias: A Comparison between the Belgian and the Italian ACE Systems (Eur. Comm'n
Taxation Papers Working Paper N.44-2014, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/sites/taxation
/files/resources/documents/taxation/gen info/economicanalysis/taxpapers/taxationpaper_44.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7ZLA-9R98].
87. Asset Managers Told to Hold More Capital: Regulators Scrutinise Balance Sheets
to Reduce Systemic Risk, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.ft.com/content/e0817f36-7a8a-11e6-
ae24-fl93b105145e [http://perma.cc/YZ8F-L6P6].
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Third, keep in mind that the larger enterprise is not necessarily less stable:
the price of Citigroup's previously noted acquisition of Fidelity was that the
combined entity would have noticeably more equity than the standalone
Citigroup. (And even today Citi could acquire Fidelity and shield Fidelity's fee-
based income from taxation, if Citi financed the acquisition via debt.) Financial
stability might well, on net, be enhanced even with an ACE-based acquisition.
Overall, a tax reform favoring equity in financial institutions and debt in
non-financial corporations should lead equity to migrate from non-financial
companies to the financial system, with debt migrating in the opposite direction.
Because risk in the financial system is more dangerous than the debt-based risk
in non-financial corporations, this migration will, on balance, lead to a more
robust economy. Hence, the first-order net arbitrage enhances systemic safety.
Tax arbitrage after reform would be less systemically-damaging than it is now,
because equity would be tax favored, and therefore sought after.
B. The Cost of Finance When Taxing Banks Properly
When regulators seek to raise the capital required of banks, bankers argue
that equity is expensive and that debt is cheaper.8 Hence, regulation that forces
banks to use more costly equity will, they say, shackle them with higher
financing costs, which they would pass on by charging borrowers more and
paying depositors less.
1. Evening Up
However apt these counters are for command-and-control regulatory
capital requirements (and we have reservations about their persuasiveness even
there), they are irrelevant for tax debiasing. Because the goal is to make capital
choices neutral between debt and equity, with the overall tax bite the same, the
overall cost of funding to the banks should be unchanged.
When banks say equity is cheaper than debt, they are largely pointing to the
fact that debt is cheaper on an after-tax basis than equity. But the proposal here
would even up the score, not raise their overall cost of capital.
88. Douglas J. Elliott, Higher Bank Capital Requirements Would Come at a Price,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/20-bank-capital-
requirements-elliott [http://perma.cc/8BZX-STY6]. For sharp criticism, see ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra
note 19, at 100-14; Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, Fallacies,
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially
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2. Facilitating the Liquidity Buffer
The ACE will lower other costs of bank safety. Consider regulation that
requires banks to own easily sellable government securities. 89 (The concept is
that if the bank suffers a cash-crunch, it can raise cash immediately by selling
these securities.) But today, if the bank finances the securities with short-term
inexpensive debt, the bank may well be made no safer; and given the tax
deductibility of interest, the bank is incentivized to finance the regulatory-
required government debt with short-term borrowings. Yet the systemically
safest way to finance the government securities is for the bank to use equity. But
with the bank taxed today on the interest income on the securities, the bank's
shareholders' net income would be below the low-risk government interest rate.
The investors in the bank's stock would be better off buying the government debt
directly. The Appendix shows the bank's and its stockholders' incentives to
undermine the safety features of the requirement and how an allowance for
equity neutralizes those incentives to undermine.
3. Redistributing Tax Benefits Within the Financial Industry
The reform would redistribute tax benefits within the banking industry,
altering the relative tax bill. Banks with high leverage would be taxed more;
banks with low leverage would be taxed less. Thus some banks already with low
leverage would be favored. This is a functional advantage of the proposal: the
tax reform would favor safer banks.
Our proposal would reduce any too-big-to-fail subsidy to banks, however,
which will make previously too-big-to-fail banks have a higher private cost of
capital because they will lose that subsidy. This shift is legitimate and good
policy. It provides some banks an incentive to oppose the proposal.
VII. Taxing Banks Improperly in Congressional Reform Proposals and Around
the World
Around the world, different ways to tax banks-levies on debt, taxes on
financial transactions, surcharges on profits-are proposed and implemented.
Most are misguided or weak; some are systemically dangerous.
89. Basel III, supra note 19.
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A. Taxing Banks Improperly: Bank Levies
Bank levies tax the bank's overall size, or its aggregate debt. 90 President
91 92Obama first proposed such a bank levy in 201091 and again in 2015, as did the
Republican chair of the House Ways and Means Committee in 2014.93 Several
European nations have enacted them. These levies are often justified as payback
for government support during the financial crisis94 and sometimes defended as
a tool to bolster safety.9 5
But at the rates enacted and proposed, these bank levies cannot be viewed
as serious regulatory tools because the tax rates for the levies are too low to
improve financial safety much. They disadvantage debt, yes, but at only about
one-tenth of the level that the current deductibility of interest advantages debt:
The bank levies aim to tax the principal amount of bank debt by between five-
hundredths and three-tenths of a percentage point for each dollar of targeted debt
the bank has on its books. So a levy on a $100 million, 3% interest loan to a bank
would range from $50,000 to $300,000 annually. But with corporate tax rates in
the United States at 35%, the basic corporate tax deduction for interest reduces
the cost of the 3% loan to the bank by about $1,000,000 annually, because the
$3,000,000 in interest reduces the firm's gross taxable income, which is taxed at
35%. That $1 million tax saving is between three and twenty times larger than
the tax cost from the levies that have been enacted or are actively discussed. The
new post-2017 corporate rate of 21% reduces that disparity to between twice and
about ten times larger.
Therein lies bank levies' limit: they do not reverse the distortion from the
deductibility of interest and, hence, their impact will be weak. To have a major
safety impact, a levy would have to be high and targeted at the riskiest bank
activities. But if high, it will weaken banks unless they are given other tax relief.
90. See A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector: Final Report for
the G-20, INT'L MONETARY FUND (2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JK7J-TZ4K].
91. Richard T. Page, Foolish Revenge or Shrewd Regulation? Financial-Industry Tax
Law Reforms Proposed in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, 85 TUL. L. REV. 191, 197 (2010); Press
Release, The White House, Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee Fact Sheet (2010),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-proposes-financial-crisis-
responsibility-fee-recoup-every-last-penn [http://perma.cc/QB5K-2GKN].
92. General Explanations ofthe Administration's Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals,
U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 160 (2015), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents
/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9ZC-NG2L].
93. Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014).
94. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Proposes Financial Crisis
Responsibility Fee to Recoup Every Last Penny for American Taxpayers (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/president-obama-proposes-financial-
crisis-responsibility-fee-recoup-every-last-penn [http://perma.cc/ZJL4-YWCE].
95. EXEC. OFFICE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 225-29 (2015).
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B. Taxing Banks Improperly: Weak and Destructive Proposals in Political
Discourse
We here note relevant taxation proposals in current political discourse.
The most prominent proposed corporate tax reform in tax policy circles
would allow corporations to deduct dividends paid, just as they can now deduct
interest.96 As we analyzed in Part IV, such a reform would work well for
industrial firms, which tend to retain cash beyond what is efficient. But for
financial firms, a dividend deduction would degrade safety severely, because to
even up the taxation of equity with debt, the bank must declare and pay out a
dividend, which drains cash from the bank, thereby weakening it.
1. Pigouvian Tax Add-Ons
Targeted bank taxes have been conceptualized as "Pigouvian," named for
Arthur Pigou, who showed how activities causing externalities, like pollution,
could be taxed at a rate reflecting their social cost.97 Bank activities that risk
damaging the economy are like pollution and can be taxed to reduce their
incidence to proper levels.98
But targeted Pigouvian taxes face the same information problems as direct
command-and-control type regulation. Authorities must target the correct risky
features, which is a daunting task. Worse yet conceptually, Pigouvian add-ons
make little sense when the overall tax framework heavily subsidizes debt: the tax
system pushes financial firms to produce the "pollution" that Pigovian reformers
then seek to abate by taxing that pollution.
Pigouvian thinking underlies the most popular financial tax reform around
the world: the financial transactions tax,99 often called a Tobin-tax, after James
Tobin, 00 the Nobel winner who promoted the idea.
2. The Financial Transaction Tax
The concept behind the Tobin-tax on financial transactions is that excessive
financial trading is destabilizing and believed to increase financial volatility with
excessive market swings, so taxing transactions would reduce trading and
96. S. COMM. ON FIN., THE BUSINESS INCOME TAX, BIPARTISAN TAX WORKING
GROUP REPORT 34-38 (2015); Stephen K. Cooper & Kaustuv Basu, Finance Committee May Soon Unveil
Corporate Integration Draft, 150 TAX NOTES 300 (Jan. 18, 2016). Reuven Avi-Yonah and Amir
Chenchinski show that the dividend deduction does much that is needed. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah &
Amir C. Chenchinski, The Case for Dividend Deduction, 65 TAX LAW 3, 3-4 (2011).
97. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
98. Enrico Perotti & Javier Suarez, A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation, 7
INT'L J. CENT. BANKING 3 (2011).
99. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced
Cooperation in the Area ofFinancial Transaction Tax, COM (2013) 71 final (Feb. 14, 2013).
100. James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153
(1978). Tobin's proposed tax targeted foreign currency trading.
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volatility. Although prominent and politically popular,' 0' it has sharp limits in
promoting overall bank safety.
First, banks can take on large risks without trading. A risky loan portfolio,
which need not trade at all, is all it takes. Second, the tax is easy to avoid, by
moving the locus of the trade to another jurisdiction without the tax. Several
European nations enacted Tobin taxes that gathered little revenue, because
trading went abroad.102 Third, evidence indicates that the tax makes finance more
volatile (because it discourages trading, leading to pricing leaps and falls).103
3. Systemically Destructive Surcharges
Worse yet, the tax direction today in some nations will weaken financial
firms. Britain in 2015 degraded its bank tax system. It had previously enacted a
small bank levy, but then replaced it with an eight percent surcharge on bank
profitS.104 A bigger tax on profits is a bigger tax on equity, which will incentivize
British banks to reduce their equity levels. This British reform is exceedingly
unwise, moving in precisely the wrong direction.
4. The 2017 Tax Reform
As this Article was moving into its final form, Congress completed a major
tax reform. o0 The new law will change the corporate tax rate, which is the rate
banks pay, and affect bank safety for the better. The corporate tax rate will fall
from 35% to 21%.106 That will affect banks directly in the ways suggested in the
discussion around Table 1. Banks will, we predict, be less opposed to equity
financing and will be comfortable with about a 2.4% equity level higher than
their comfort level now.
Moreover, with operating firms' equity taxed more favorably than it is now,
American firms would have less demand for debt and more for equity, somewhat
shrinking the financial sector, albeit to an uncertain extent. And, lastly, the bill
101. See Shelley Marshall, Shifting Responsibility: How the Burden of the European
Financial Crisis ShiftedAwayfrom the Financial Sector and Onto Labor, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
449, 472 (2014) (noting that there is "support across much of Europe [for a] financial transaction tax");
Editorial, The Needfor a Tax on Financial Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28,2016), http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/01/28/opinion/the-need-for-a-tax-on-financial-trading.html [http://perma.cc/44YL-F67R].
102. C.R., Do Tobin Taxes Actually Work?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/09/economist-explains-i [http://perma.cc
/D5N4-U7WJ]. For a review of the academic literature, see Gunther Capelle-Blanchard & Olena
Havrylchyk, The Impact of the French Securities Transaction Tax on Market Liquidity and Volatility, 47
INT'L REV. OF FIN. ANALYSIS 166 (2016).
103. Anna Pomeranets & Daniel G. Weaver, Securities Transaction Taxes and Market
Quality (Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2011-26, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm
/SSRNID2214058_codel770334.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6HU-XKKS].
104. Finance (No. 2) Act 2015, c. 33 (Eng.). Section 16 of the Act lowers the levy on
bank liabilities in steps, from 2016 to 2021. Section 17 adds the eight percent surcharge on bank profits.
105. Tax Cuts and Job Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
106. Id. § 13001.
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would limit the tax deductibility of interest to 30% of a firm's base income. 0 7
This would also reduce the economy's demand for lending from the financial
sector, also to an uncertain extent.
Uncertainties remain. Commentary indicated a belief that the corporate tax
rate was, although formally "permanent," at serious risk of being raised by a
near-future Congress, because of controversy, future revenue needs, and the
partisan nature of its passage. (Since the law passed without Democratic votes,
it's thought to be vulnerable to change if control of Congress and the Presidency
change.108 ) The lack of confidence in the stability of some of the tax changes in
Table 1 that benefited bank equity undermined banks' confidence in fully
adjusting to the incentives. The rate change will still substantially incentivize
banks to use less equity than is optimally safe; an ACE on nonregulatory equity
would still be the best way to proceed.
C. The Propitious Political Economy of Taxing Banks Properly
Is bank-based tax reform here politically viable?
1. How Strongly Will Banks Oppose It?
Banks have less incentive to oppose being taxed properly than to oppose
equally efficacious command-and-control regulation. Because the tax fix should
not take more money out from the banks, it will cause banks less pain than does
tighter capital and activity regulation. And small banks, which are politically
powerful, tend to be better capitalized already, so they could well support the
reform.
True, banks will not powerfully promote the reform; they and their
executives are accustomed to current bank taxation. Properly taxing banks will
also reduce any too-big-to-fail subsidy to banks, which benefits bank equity and,
derivatively, bank management. But if regulators persuaded banks that the
regulators could forgo the next level of command-and-control regulation, then
banks might be enticed to go along.
2. Deposits are Politically Untouchable
Bank liabilities include retail deposits. While a safety-oriented tax reform
need not distinguish insured deposits from other borrowings, there are reasons
to do so. On safety, insured deposits do not run as quickly in a crisis as other
107. Id. § 13301. Since the limitation is based on net interest expense (interest income
minus interest expense), the limit would not affect bank taxation here, because banks' interest income is
nearly always higher than their interest expense.
108. Rebecca Kysar & Linda Sugin, The Built-In Instability of the G.O.P.'s Tax Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/opinion/republican-tax-bill-unstable
.html [http://perma.cc/G55P-W3UA].
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bank debts. On practical politics, regulators will not want to tax retail deposit
liabilities unfavorably.
Reform that increases the taxation of bank debt need not affect insured
deposits. U.S. banks have half of their funding coming from deposits, with equity
funding nearly ten percent and the remaining forty percent coming from non-
deposit debt.1 09 At this proportion, the nondeposit debt on which the tax reforms
would operate amounts to a hefty four times the level of equity, meaning that
even a deposit-exempt proper taxation of banks can be efficacious.
3. Fix It All
Purists might object to changing how banks are taxed with the view that all
of corporate tax needs to be fixed, not just that for banks.
We sympathize with this view, but would not want to make the perfect the
enemy of the very good. Waiting for a full corporate debt-equity tax reform
probably means no bank-safety tax reform at all. Substantial corporate tax reform
proposals emerged from the U.S. Treasury in 1992, but did not move through
Congress. The best political economy explanation for the failure was not that
highly motivated interests killed the proposal, but that some executives preferred
the current corporate tax, because it discourages distributions and facilitates the
executives' desire to retain cash." 0 And the tax-equalizing reform for industry
must differ from that for finance anyway. The recent tax reform that will lower
the corporate tax rate to twenty-one percent does not address bank taxation
directly, but as noted above should have a noticeable but incomplete impact on
bank safety.
A practical impediment to the proposal here is related. The congressional
committee handling bank legislation is not the same as the one handling tax
legislation-e.g., the House Committee on Financial Services for the former,
Ways and Means for the latter.' Our proposal is addressed to the financial
regulators, but they, even if convinced, may be less able to influence
congressional tax committees than banking committees.
Conclusion
The next regulatory frontier for making finance safer should be to
restructure the corporate taxation of financial firms. Interest should no longer be
109. See Kevin Buehler, Peter Noteboom & Dan Williams, Between Deluge and
Drought: The Future of US Bank Liquidity and Funding-Rebalancing the Balance Sheet During
Turbulent Times 3 ex.1 (McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, No. 48, July 2013),
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client service/Risk/Working%20papers/48 Futur
e%20of%/020US%20funding.ashx [http://perma.cc/EAE9-ZBAR].
110. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 44, at 327-28. The issue then was integration of
corporate and personal taxation.
111. See Rules of the House of Representatives, Effective for One Hundred Twelfth
Congress (Jan. 5, 2011) (House Rule X(1)(h), (t)).
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taxed favorably, at least at the margin, while equity is taxed unfavorably.
Evening up the two will create better incentives for safety in finance. The tax
change will incentivize banks to use more equity and less debt.
We analyzed four tax reforms that would greatly increase financial safety
in a sequence moving from the most general (and most effective) to the most
targeted and most politically and technically viable. The first would
comprehensively reform corporate taxation of both nonfinancial and financial
firms. We add as a rationale for a system-wide fix that it will increase financial
safety via two channels: the financial sector would lose the tax-based bias for
debt and separately, the industrial sector would demand less lending from the
financial sector.
The next most general tax reform would reform bank taxation by
eliminating the deduction for interest. The change would widen the tax base for
financial firms and rates could drop precipitously. That base-widening and rate-
lowering comports with prevailing American tax norms, but has major
drawbacks. The just-enacted cut in the corporate tax to twenty-one percent
should reduce banks' preference for debt, which is useful for bank safety. More
could be done, as our extrapolation from the studies done thus far points to
reducing the aversion to equity by 2.4%, but a preference for 6% or more of extra
equity is plausible to achieve by fully evening out the tax costs of debt and equity.
The third general reform would focus on equity, allowing banks to deduct
an allowance for their cost of equity. It would narrow the tax base sharply and
reduce revenue from bank taxation. But debt-based offsets can make the reform
revenue neutral. An obvious offset would be a levy on bank liabilities. Another
would be to reduce the deductibility of nondeposit interest payments, particularly
on the systemically riskiest debt.
The core of our preferred solution, the fourth we analyze, is to allow banks
a deduction for the cost of their equity that exceeds the regulatory minimum.
That deduction would make additional bank equity as tax-attractive as debt. This
fix best combines safety enhancement, minimal disruption to the extant tax
system, and political viability. Because our preferred reform would only apply
to the portion of equity that the bank has above the regulatory required level, the
offsets needed for revenue neutrality would be modest.
The reform would better align the incentives of bank shareholders and bank
executives with the public interest in financial safety and stability. If we have
reached the limits of command-and-control regulation either as a policy or as a
political matter, but have not yet made the financial system as safe as it needs to
be for continued prosperity, it is time to turn to reforming the banks' real
incentives. And if the command-and-control progress thus far made is rolled
back, then the tax alignment strategy that we push forward needs even more
urgently to be high on the agenda for containing systemic risk.
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Appendix A: Tax Cost to Goldman Sachs by Capitalizing at IMF/FDIC Best
Safety Level
The International Monetary Fund estimates that bank capital-to-asset ratios
between 8.5% and 13% would have avoided between 70% and 80% of past
banking crises in the world's richer nations.112 U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation estimates are similar."13
Here we estimate the tax impact of banks reaching that safety level. The
FDIC estimates that U.S. banks' non-risk-adjusted capital is now on average
5.75% of assets, with larger banks having lower than average capital. Goldman
Sachs, for example, is at 4.4%.114 Goldman would need to approximately double
its capital to be at the IMF's minimum safety goal and triple it to be at the top
safety level.
If Goldman Sachs sought to, or were required to, reach the lower IMF goal,
without changing the bank's size, it would need roughly $80 billion more in
equity and would reduce its debt by the same amount.' If it sought to or were
required to reach the upper goal, it would need more than $160 billion in
additional equity.
How much tax would Goldman have to pay to substitute this new equity
for debt? That cost depends on what debt it would retire and what interest rate it
paid on that debt. Current interest rates in 2017 are at near-historical lows, with
Goldman's interest expense in 2016 at about 0.9% of its overall debt and about
5% on its long-term subordinated debt.116 A future effort to get to the highest
IMF goal could require Goldman to substitute the new equity for debt paying a
more typical long-term 7% interest.
112. The relevant IMF staff paper is Dagher et al., supra note 20. This 8.5% to 13%
target ratio is not weighted for the riskiness of the bank's assets.
113. Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, FDIC, Statement on the Semi-Annual Update
of the Global Capital Index (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spsep20l6.html
[http://perma.cc/AZ7Y-2ZDY].
114. Global Capital Index: Capitalization Ratios for Global Systemically Important
Banks (GSIBs) Data as of June 30, 2016, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig
/capitalizationratio2ql6.pdf [http://perma.cc/3EJ2-AF7T]. The American Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation uses the higher International Reporting Standard's asset calculation rather than the United
States' generally accepted accounting principle calculation. The differences come from different risk-
weighting rules and differing rules on netting similar obligations and assets. Netting will decrease the total
asset level (as well as the total liability level). But the bottom-line result of more debt sharply increasing
the tax bill does not change.
115. FDIC, supra note 114. The FDIC estimates Goldman Sachs IFRS assets to be
$1,902 billion. Its total capital approximates .044*$1,902 billion, or $83 billion. The IMF's projection of
13% to avoid most banking crises would need .13*$1,902, or $247 billion, an increase of about $160
billion. (U.S. GAAP assets would be about half as much; the earlier capital goals for the IMF, stated
supra, note 20, were based on the lower U.S. GAAP asset calculation. Using those numbers, with a higher
target capital level and higher equity level, would lead to a similarly very high percentage of 2016 profits
absorbed by the lost tax advantage of deductible debt.)
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The following table shows the Goldman's increased tax bill as a portion of
2016 profits" 7 from reaching the IMF's highest capital goal, under three
different interest rate assumptions: that the new equity is substituted for
(1) primarily short-term debt at the current historically low interest rate, (2)
primarily long-term debt at the current historically low interest rate, and (3)
primarily long-term debt at a more typical long-term interest rate. (Using the
lowest IMF goal would have results half as large.)
The tax hit when short-term interest rates are low, at 3.3% to 6.6% of
current profits may seem small (depending on whether we assess the IMF's low
or high estimate) and might be dismissed as unlikely to affect bank behavior. But
in a hyper-competitive financial marketplace where investment bankers fight for
a few hundredths of a percentage point in yield, it would not be ignored.
Financial players seem ready to alter behavior for competitive advantage to
capture a few hundredths of a percentage point of interest for themselves and
their organization." 8 And the impact of the substitution being for long-term debt
at normal interest levels is tremendous, amounting to one-half of 2016 profits.
Table 9
Impact of Goldman reaching 011F's high safety goal of S160 billion increased
capital as a percentage of 2016 profit
Curren over, all Curn long- Log-er ihteres
Tax icrease 0l.0o*$"160 50*100 ',o*100
billion * 35" billion * 35" billion * 35"o
$504 11illion $. hillion $3IN hillionl
Percentage of 6.0"a of protit 37" of protit 51.8%, of profit
2016 profit of (froll 5(04 7570) (froll 18. 5) (from 3.18/7.57)
S7.57 billion
This table shows the impact of equity increases on Goldman's 2016 tax bill as a percentage of those
profits. Instead of the main regulatory ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets, we use an approximation of
the bank's "leverage" ratio-that is, equity as a percentage of total assets (as calculated under International
Financial Reporting Standards rules). That level is about 4.14% for Goldman, with its risk-weighted ratio
higher. The leverage ratio corresponds more closely than the regulators' risk-weighted ratio to what is
taxed. The equity levels we use for the estimates are the IMF's highest goal-13%. For the debt that the
equity would replace, we estimate results for Goldman's current average interest paid, its current long-
term interest rate, and a more typical long-term interest rate of 7%. This yields several plausible estimates.
Estimating the impact of the lower IMF goal would yield results about half as large. Using the recently
117. By reducing interest payments, reduced debt will also change overall profit levels.
118. See Stein, supra note 14.
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enacted corporate tax rate of 21% changes the bottom right extrapolation to have the IMF/FDIC safety
goal to about 3 0% of Goldman's 2016 profits. Still not a small hit to after-tax profit.
Appendix B: Negative Tax Impact on Bank from Regulatory Requirement to
Hold Liquid Treasuries
The current tax structure discourages banks from holding low-risk liquid
securities like U.S. Treasuries. Here, we show why that is.
Posit that regulators require that banks like Citibank hold more low-risk
government securities, as they generally have been.11 9 Assume it must hold $100
billion of U.S. Treasury bonds, of any maturity, and, seeking the best rate, Citi
chooses a long-term bond with a five percent interest rate.120
Citibank could finance these bonds by borrowing $100 billion or by raising
$100 billion in equity. If it borrows, then the interest earned on the bonds is offset
by the interest paid to the financing source, yielding no tax under the current
system. But if it finances the bonds with new safe equity, then the bank would
pay about $1.75 billion in additional tax, from thirty-five percent (the current
corporate tax rate) of $5 billion. Citi's stockholders will obtain only $3.25 billion
of Citi's $5 billion, with the rest going to the Internal Revenue Service. Equity
investors in the bank today would see the investment as a loss-generating part of
the bank's portfolio. They would be better off holding the Treasury bonds
directly, instead of paying the $1.75 billion in taxes to the government. Hence,
banks and their investors, for their own private reasons, resist this type of safety-
enhancing regulation.
If the bank invests in long-term Treasury bonds and finances that purchase
with new short-term borrowing at a lower interest rate, then the transaction could
be profitable for the bank, but would not make the bank any safer. Although
possessing the liquid Treasury bonds would make the bank safer, that safety
would largely be offset or exceeded by the bonds being financed by short-term
runnable debt.
However, with the allowance for corporate equity, the bank could deduct
the cost of equity from its Treasury bond income; hence, the bank would no
longer have a tax reason to avoid equity financing. Tax reform thereby helps the
regulators facilitate safety by affecting the banks' asset mix (more low-risk
government debt) as well as by affecting the banks' financing structure (more
stable, safety-enhancing equity).
The impact on the after-tax cost of equity should be the same as the after-
tax cost of the added debt. This follows from the well-known Modigliani-Miller
theorem,121 and can be intuited by considering a corporation whose single asset
119. As is now required. Basel III, supra note 19.
120. That rate is higher than today's historically low rates. But, five percent or higher
is both more typical for long-term rates and more intuitive to calculate.
121. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance,
and the Theory ofInvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
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is that $100 billion Treasury bond. Because the bond provides the equity holders
with $5 billion in income, they will value the firm at $100 billion and expect $5
billion in income annually; this corresponds to the last column of our table
below. If it instead provided them with only $3.75 billion in annual income
because the income is taxed unfavorably, then they will value that investment at
only $65 billion, which corresponds to the table's third column.
The following table calculates the results for each of these scenarios.
(Had the table been constructed with the new 21% corporate tax rate, the
differences would persist, but narrow. The new 21% rate would lead to an
increase of the after-tax income in the first column from $2.6 billion to about
$3.2 billion; it would reduce the loss at the bottom of the third column of equity
financing to about $1 billion. The differential would narrow under the new rate
but would persist as substantial.)
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